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foreword
The view that protected areas (PAs) are pristine areas
where human action must be controlled  and in some
instances local people thus removed  and the history of
these areas must be addressed if PAs are to be seen as
integral assets for local, national and international goods
and services. The concepts and structures that guided the
development of PAs in the 20th century are inadequate for
the challenges of the 21st century. The constituencies and
purposes of PAs are changing rapidly and, if they are to
have a significant place in southern Africas future
politico-economic map, these changes must be ad-
dressed.
There is a growing trend worldwide towards involving
rural communities in managing biological resources. In
this regard, major advances have been made in southern
Africa and policies and legislation put in place. However,
questions are beginning to be asked about the
commitment of governments to ensuring the success of
these community approaches for community develop-
ment and biological-diversity conservation through
equitable access to and use of resources. Southern Africas
extensive experience in these community approaches
indicates that they are institutionally inhibited by a lack of
proprietary devolution. There is a need to give formal
recognition and entitlements essential for their effective
management.
Experiences from southern Africa further indicate that
the PA and community approaches are complementary in
their contribution to conserving biological diversity. Yet
the efforts of rural people to conserve biological diversity
are rarely officially recognised by governments. It is
apparent from the discussions at the technical workshop
that this view has to change and that governments have
to not only recognise community inputs in conservation,
but also protect communities access to these resources.
The workshop thus warmly endorsed TILCEPAs (the
Theme on Indigenous and Local Communities, Equity
and Protected Areas) proposals to add a governance
dimension to The World Conservation Unions (IUCN)
list of PA categories, to include community-conserved
areas (CCAs) and co-managed protected areas (CMPAs).
The active involvement of those living in and around PAs
can enhance both conservation and development
objectives. Consequently, PA goals and structures should
be reviewed to achieve this synergy and CMPAs should be
further developed on the basis of negotiated formal
agreements between PAs management and neighbouring
authorities regarding reciprocal responsibilities and
benefits. A formal statement summarising these views
was adopted by the workshop at its concluding session




 on local communities, equity and protected areas
in community-conserved areas (CCAs), co-managed
protected areas (CMPAs) and protected areas (PAs)





1. The provision of ecological and socio-economic value
by official, state-declared PAs is currently sub-optimal.
2. PAs in transitional societies will survive only by
serving the needs of their constituencies, which
include the conservation of biodiversity, ecosystem
services and also a variety of social, economic and
cultural values.
3. The trade-offs between biodiversity and socio-
economic values are currently exaggerated and the
synergies underestimated.
4. Greater involvement of those living in and around
PAs can contribute to PA and landscape conservation.
5. In many cases, protected areas can act as local engines
for economic and social development.
6. Integrating protected areas into their surrounding
landscapes and generating synergies with local
communities has advantages in terms of both
performance and accountability.
The workshop accordingly recommended that:
1. The goals and governance structures of official, state-
declared PAs be reviewed to better contribute to the
objectives of society at large and to enhance local
livelihoods, governance and economic development.
2. State-declared PAs should provide residents and
neighbours with full legitimacy and status in co-
management governance structures.
3. CMPAs should function as subsidiary decision-
making units, uniting legitimate stakeholders,
internalising costs and benefits, and sharing them





1. There is strong evidence that devolution to the lowest
proprietary units delivers substantial institutional,
livelihood and conservation benefits.
2. Many of the necessary tools, principles and
knowledge to take devolution into effect have been
developed and tested through a variety of community-
based natural resource management (CBNRM)
initiatives.
3. Devolution principles and practices have seldom been
applied to best effect in the southern African region.
4. TILCEPAs definition of CCAs as natural and
modified ecosystems including significant biodiversity,
ecological services and cultural values voluntarily
conserved by concerned indigenous and local
communities through customary laws or other
effective means generally corresponds with the
localised proprietory regimes which CBNRM
experience in southern Africa suggests is appropriate
for many contexts.
5. CCAs can be effective examples of devolution if they
are provided with the necessary status and
entitlements.
The workshop therefore recommended that:
! CCAs and their associated proprietary rights and
responsibilities be officially recognised in national and
international statutes and included as a governance
form within The World Conservation Union
(IUCN) PA category system.
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technical workshop
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INTRODUCTION
This publication reports on a technical workshop entitled
Communities and Conservation in Southern Africa: Key
Issues and Challenges towards a more Equitable and
Sustainable Future, which was held on 2628 February
2003 in Pretoria, South Africa, in preparation for the World
Parks Congress to be held in Durban in September 2003.
The workshop sought to synthesise the extensive
experience of southern African countries on community-
based conservation and natural resources management
into concrete inputs and recommendations for the World
Parks Congress 2003.
Background to the workshop
The World Congress on Protected Areas, or World Parks
Congress (WPC) as it has become known, is held once
every ten years and provides the main global forum for
reviewing the status and role of PAs in conservation and
development. The WPC is a major international event
and offers a unique opportunity to take stock of progress
and setbacks on the management of PAs, as well as to
chart their course over the next decade and beyond. The
first WPC took place in 1962 in Seattle, USA. The
subsequent three were held in Yellowstone, USA (1972),
with the theme National parks  A heritage for a better
world; in 1982 in Bali, Indonesia, with the theme Parks
for development, and in 1992 in Caracas, Venezuela,
with the theme Parks for life.
The 5th World Parks Congress will be held in Durban,
South Africa, from 817 September 2003. This congress
follows three major international events relevant to issues
of community conservation and development, which
were held in 2002. These events were:
! the 6th Conference of the Parties to the Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD)
! the World Summit on Sustainable Development
(WSSD)
! the 12th Conference of the Parties to the the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES).
All these international events, including the WPC, share a
common challenge, which is how to support indigenous
and local communities in conserving and managing their
natural resources sustainably in the face of poverty.
To this end, the next WPC is appropriately themed
Benefits beyond borders. This clearly defines the
challenge for the next decade: showing and realising
benefits from PAs in the broader economic, social and
environmental context for humankind in the 21st
century. The theme sketches the opportunities for PAs in
the next millennium and the range of meanings or
interpretations implicit in the terms benefits and
boundaries. It also provides the flexibility for the WPC
to explore a wide variety of relevant sub-themes.
In this regard, the World Commission on Protected
Areas (WCPA) and the Commission on Environmental,
Economic and Social Policy (CEESP), both arms of the
World Conservation Union (IUCN) have established an
inter-commission Theme on Indigenous and Local
Communities, Equity and Protected Areas (TILCEPA).
The WPC and this inter-commission theme represent a
significant opportunity to highlight and promote the
interests of indigenous and local communities with
respect to neighbouring PAs, notably as concerns access
and equity issues, and community conservation and co-
management opportunities. It was in this context that
TILCEPA requested Africa Resources Trust-Zimbabwe
(ART) and the Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies
(PLAAS) at the University of the Western Cape, South
Africa, to organise and host the southern Africa technical
workshop to explore relevant themes for the WPC and a
strategy for southern Africa to engage with the WPC.
The organisers would like to acknowledge the support
from the Siemenpuu and Ford Foundations that enabled
the hosting of the workshop and this publication.
TILCEPA, ART and PLAAS provided part of the funding
for the workshop. Resource Africa, represented by Kule
Chitepo and Julian Sturgeon, facilitated the workshop.
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Rationale and objectives of the
technical workshop
The workshop brought together academics, practitioners,
policy makers and community representatives with
interest in CBNRM in the southern African region. The
purpose of the workshop was to review lessons learned
in the relationship between southern African communities
and PAs, with a view to understanding effectiveness (for
example, in terms of biodiversity conservation,
sustainability of resource use, betterment of living
conditions, maintenance of community identity, and so
on), sustainability and equity (especially in terms of
distribution of the costs and benefits of conservation),
the extent and regional distribution of CCAs and the
traditional/legal mechanisms of their maintenance. The
focus was on governance aspects of PAs, particularly
those related to areas that are outside official PAs, CCAs
and CMPAs. These areas  often relying on collaborations
between the state or private sector on the one hand, and
communities on the other  were seen as important with
regard to issues of fairness, equity and representation of
resource users. On the basis of lessons learnt in dealing
with these issues in southern Africa, the workshop
explored what can be done, feasibly and concretely, to
promote more equitable and effective ways of managing
natural resources and PAs in southern Africa and beyond.
On this basis, the workshop drafted a set of
recommendations emanating from lessons learnt.
This report forms part of the results of the workshop
that will be presented at the WPC in September 2003, and
be made available through other platforms beyond the
Congress. The report includes:
! a statement drawn up by regional participants at the
workshop
! five thematic papers delivered at the workshop
! lessons learnt in Southern Africa
! a set of recommendations for dealing with the
challenges of communities and conservation.
Where possible, boxed case studies have been prepared to
highlight the lessons learnt and to support the
recommendations provided.
In all, 45 specialists from various disciplines from the
southern Africa region participated in the workshop. The
participants analysed in depth five papers that were
presented to illustrate and take stock of the key sub-
themes identified for the workshop. The workshop was
held over three days and was structured as follows:
! The first day was dedicated to the presentation of five
commissioned thematic papers. The themes were
designed to highlight lessons learnt and issues
arising in the field of communities, conservation and
development in the region.
! On the second day, participants were divided into
four groups1 according to four of the seven WPC
workshop streams to be addressed in September
2003. The groups were tasked with synthesising
lessons learnt from experiences of community-
managed resources, CCAs and CMPAs, and to
develop a set of lessons learnt and recommendations
for interacting with areas managed and conserved by
local communities throughout the region. Specific
case/sites to illustrate key regional issues and lessons
learnt were also discussed.
! The third day was dedicated to consolidating the
lessons learnt and the recommendations arising,
including a discussion on the workshop outputs and







In introducing the workshop, Dr Cecil Machena of ART
outlined the objectives of the workshop, noting that this
was an opportune time for southern Africa to share lessons
learnt in working with communities in conservation and
development initiatives. Grazia Borrini-Feyerabend, Co-
Chair of the IUCN TILCEPA, expanded on the
objectives and spelt out briefly why the workshop was
relevant. She stressed the need for southern Africa to
share its lessons learned in dealing with communities and
conservation, but also in addressing issues of social
justice and equity in relation to resource conservation and
governance of various forms of PAs.
The lessons learnt in southern Africa are collected as part
of a worldwide effort by TILCEPA to gather experiences
and lessons from different regions. A common finding is
that initiatives of rural communities in conservation are
poorly known and understood, and even less recognised,
in official conservation circles. CCAs are still playing a
crucial role in many environments but are under serious
threat  more than any other form of conservation.
CMPAs also provide an opportunity for indigenous and
local communities to contribute to conservation and
development through partnership agreements and
organisations with state governments, the private sector
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and other social actors. Conservation partnerships are
becoming a common phenomenon but often still have a
long way to go from paternalism and tokenism to
genuine negotiation and mutual engagement.
Grazia stressed the strong focus of the Durban WPC on
governance of PAs. Two major issues will be the focus of
that discussion. The first is good governance principles.
These will be developed starting from those proposed by
the UN  legitimacy and voice, accountability, fairness,
direction, and performance  as important for all types of
PAs. Notably, the UN principles spell out a much more
open agenda than that of reducing good governance to a
minimal role of government in public affairs. The second
issue is governance type. Different governance types can
be distinguished according to who holds authority,
responsibility and accountability in management. The
importance of understanding and recognising the full
spectrum of governance types that contribute to
conservation as part of national systems will be
highlighted in Durban. In this sense, state-managed, co-
managed (including trans-boundary), private and
community-conserved areas should all be fully recognised
and supported to act in complementary, equitable and
synergistic roles.
INTRODUCTION
The workshop was honoured by an address by the
Director-General of the IUCN, Mr Achim Steiner, who
encouraged the exploration of new, people-centred
approaches to protected-area policy that took into account
politico-economic and governance issues. Mr Steiner
noted the role played by southern Africa in shifting
mindsets in relation to communities, conservation and
development. He encouraged the region to continue on
their path of intellectual rigour and relevancy of policy,
which led to the pioneering of partnerships between
government and communities. Communities have also
been involved in conservation without the involvement
of the state, and the region should showcase these case
studies.
1. Theme groups: 1. Linkages in landscape/seascape 
linkages including social, economical, ecological, cultural
(not as isolated entities). 2. Governance of PAs 
interaction between structures processes  about power,
relationships and  who decides, consensus, who
benefits, who does something, is that just, who is
accountable to who. 3. Management effectiveness. 4.
Sustainable finance and resources
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The first day of the workshop was dedicated to the
presentation of thematic papers that provided a basis for
deciding on a strategy to engage with the WPC. The
themes, in order of presentation, were as follows:
Pre-colonial and colonial
conservation practices and their
legacy today  James Murombedzi
This paper comprised three parts:
! pre-colonial conservation practices in the southern
African region, with an emphasis on community-
based conservation
! conservation systems and practices developed under
the colonial regime
! the legacies of the pre-colonial and colonial systems
today.
The paper thus explored the evolution and development
of pre-colonial and colonial conservation practices, and
demonstrated their influences on contemporary
conservation policies and practices. A long-term historical
approach was used, and for the most part Zimbabwe was
the primary point of reference, although examples from
other parts of the region were used and discussed during
the plenary session. The paper and discussions showed
that the history of conservation in most of southern
Africa followed broadly similar trajectories, with
differences only in the detail.
Origins and processes of modern
CBNRM practices in the southern
Africa region  Brian Child
This paper dealt with the key characteristics of modern
CBNRM practices in southern Africa and traced their
origins. The paper concluded that the evolution of
CBNRM is linked to wildlife policies developed for
privately-held land and where conflicts between human
practices and wildlife existed. The origins of CBNRM are
thus linked to resolving wildlife-human conflicts. The
success of CBNRM on mostly state land under
communal arrangements has been linked to some official
protected areas agencies, which have been instrumental in
driving modern CBNRM practices in southern Africa.
Lessons learnt from the
philosophy and practice of CBNRM
in southern Africa  Brian Jones
This presentation examined the challenges and
opportunities faced in the southern African region during
the emergence of an array of wildlife management
systems, including:
! private landholders
! corporate conservancies on private pooled land
! communal conservancies (for example in Namibia)
! communal management regimes (for example, the
Communal Areas Management Programme for
Indigenous Resources [Campfire]).
The paper concluded that implementation of CBNRM
initiatives, despite numerous problems, have provided
sufficient evidence in southern Africa to suggest that
conservation need not be confined to formally
proclaimed state-run PAs. The lessons learnt from the
philosophy and practice of CBNRM point to the need for
a number of strategies that can improve the performance
of community-based approaches. Rights of local
communities need to be strengthened through policies
and legislation that are drafted on the basis of the
evidence linking sustainable management with strong
proprietorship and strong economic incentives.
Devolution should be based on the lowest appropriate
level of jurisdiction. From there, scaling up should take
place, where necessary, through the delegation of
authority upward. Decision making about use of income
should be taken at village level rather than at the supra-
committee level, ensuring greater participation by
The southern Africa context:
Thematic issues
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residents. Communities should be supported in
maximising their income-generation opportunities within
acceptable environmental and social limits and taking into
account tourist-carrying capacities.
Conditions for effective, stable,
sustainable and equitable
conservation at the national
level in southern Africa  Rowan
Martin
This presentation dealt primarily with conditions that
have to be met at a national level for successful
conservation both within state PAs and outside of such
areas. The paper concluded that outside PAs the first
necessary condition for successful conservation 
devolution of authority for natural resources to
landholders  has not been met fully. It emerged that in
most instances in the region the definition of landholders
was fuzzy except where freehold existed. The paper noted
that PAs are often too big to be financially viable and to
contribute effectively to biodiversity conservation.
The impact of regional and
international instruments,
policies and processes and donors
on effective, sustainable and
equitable conservation in
southern Africa  Cecil Machena
This presentation discussed the role that international
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) have
played in the conservation movement in southern Africa
and other areas. The presentation also looked at how
conservation systems in southern Africa have influenced
the overall thinking and decision making at the
international level. The paper focused on the provisions
of two MEAs: Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES)
and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). The
paper highlighted the fact that within conservation
practices in southern Africa CITES has been very
controversial in conflicting with wildlife management
policies and legislation in the region. The CBD, on the
other hand, provides a better framework for integrating
conservation and development. The problem is that
CITES is a legal international agreement in itself and the
CBD cannot override it. However, the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) is making efforts to create a fair
multilateral trade frame. Hence the rights and obligations
of these two MEAs are examined in relation to those of
the WTO.
These thematic papers provided a basis from which
lessons learnt were drawn out and recommendations
formulated. The following section discusses these
presentations in greater detail. Lessons learnt and
recommendations are discussed in sections 4 and 5
respectively. Edited versions of the papers presented are
provided in section 6.
Discussions based on the
thematic papers
As pointed out earlier in this report, the five thematic
papers were intended to provide a basis on which
experiences and lessons from the southern Africa region
could be discussed and synthesised. Consequently, the
discussions that followed the presentation of the papers
aimed at capturing regional experiences and
recommendations that could be presented at the WPC in




! It was emphasised that there are distinct phases
through which conservation should be viewed. One
of these, the pre-colonial phase, is at times
romanticised as if pre-colonial communities lived in
perfect harmony with nature. Even though there is
limited clarity and evidence on exactly how this
happened, conservation attempts are likely to have
reflected attempts to exercise power by clans and
certain groups over resources and people. In fact, pre-
colonial idioms reflect lineage cults based on religion,
professionalism and territory, the functions of which
were production and distribution of food. These
cults were also responsible for resource conservation
through control of fires and forced movements of
people from areas prone to ecological disasters.
! The development of conventional conservation by
colonial governments separating humans from
nature was part of the broader attempt to advance
colonialism through alienating people from resources
they previously used and had control over. Ironically,
post-colonial governments have also perpetuated
these separatist approaches. In other words, there
appears to be more continuity than change as post-
colonial governments seem to be enhancing colonial
practices of disempowering poor rural communities.
An example cited of this was the Haroni Rusitu
tropical forest in Zimbabwe where rural communities
have preserved parts of the forest as a sacred area, only
to be frustrated by the Rhodesian colonial authorities
and later the Zimbabwe government (see Box 1).
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! The question to address is why it is taking so long for
post-colonial governments to rethink the paradigm
of PAs if pre-colonial communities had clear reasons
for practising conservation. A combination of factors
might be responsible for this. Firstly, there is a market
influence from international conventions and donor
agencies. A good example here is that in the setting up
of PAs donors insist on the confirmation of the PA
boundaries before funds are made available.
Secondly, science  and strong views held by
powerful and privileged people who are interested
in the wilderness, unspoilt or pristine nature 
continues to perpetuate the dominant paradigm that
holds poor rural people responsible for resource
degradation. Yet there is evidence of the role of
indigenous knowledge and technical input in pre-
colonial conservation. This evidence is highlighted by
the complex systems of conservation and resource
regulation. Protected areas were set up in pre-colonial
times  for example, King Shaka had a hunting
reserve, the present-day Hluhluwe Game Reserve,
and King Mzilikazi introduced a permit system for
colonial hunting. King Mzilikazi also set up a game
reserve called Madukuza where no-one was allowed
to hunt without the kings permission. Other factors
were used to effect resource conservation but pre-
colonial conservation was based largely on perceptions
of unity between resources and people where the
Box 1: The role and dynamics of traditional institutions
in the management of the Haroni and Rusitu forests
in Chimanimani, Zimbabwe
Two unique patches of tropical lowland moist forest have been the subject of contested management and
ownership between traditional local institutions and external agencies, including successive governments, in
Zimbabwe. To the local people and their institutions, the forests are sacred and should be preserved as such. To the
government and other external agencies, the forests face the threat of total destruction by the local people. Ways have
to be identified to save the forests. The local people have managed the forests (and continue to do so) over the years
through local institutions and locally instituted informal rules and regulations. The colonial and post-colonial
governments have instituted a different approach that included declaring the forests botanical reserves and, recently,
promoting a Campfire-based eco-tourism programme. The local people have, through the years, resisted the
appropriation of their declared sacred forests through several means, ranging from physical confrontation to passive
acceptance. It is concluded that forest values should be broadly defined to include non-material, non-economic social
values.
Before independence, local institutions were largely left alone due to security problems in the area. Later, the then
colonial government gazetted the Rusitu forests as botanical reserves to be protected through state institutions.
After independence, the new government reaffirmed the colonial policies, and in fact, intensified the
disempowerment process. In the 1990s, a Campfire programme was introduced, further disempowering local
institutions. New institutional arrangements were put in place to replace traditional mechanisms of management.
Traditional institutions have, however, displayed resilience in the face of all these pressures.  Local people have
contested the gazetting of the forests as botanical reserves since 1974. There is no agreement on the boundaries of
the forests. From 1974 to 1992, the boundaries of the forests were neither surveyed nor demarcated due to wars in
the area (the liberation war between 1975 and 1980 and the Mozambique National Resistance conflict in
Mozambique). It was only in 1992 that government started efforts to demarcate the boundaries. A number of
homesteads were enclosed within the reserve boundaries and these people continue to resist eviction.
The locals recognise much smaller areas considered sacred, while government boundaries are broader. The
inextricable link between humans, nature and the spiritual world is a strong feature of natural resource management
in Rusitu. Yet this has never been considered by external agencies, including government. Spiritualism, or the belief
in the supernatural world, creates respect for flora and fauna. Living beings communicate with the ancestors through
song, dance and offering of snuff and beer to the ancestors. Local people perceive benefits in maintaining sacred
forests in their natural, undisturbed state. The forests, therefore, provide both non-material and material benefits
for the local people (for example, poles, thatching grass, medicines, soil erosion control, watershed protection, and
wildlife habitat).  There are several traditional rules, beliefs and practices that contribute towards the management of
the forests in Rusitu. These rules and regulations govern management of resources inside and outside forest areas.
These rules and regulations pertain to the management of individual trees, burial sites and sacred forests and pools.




actual motivation was to guarantee access to
resources.
! Religion was also important for resource conservation.
Sacred groves were sites where natural resources were
often left entirely unspoiled. Sacred groves ranged
from individual to group efforts, for example,
Matopos, that was later converted to a protected
conservation area under conventional approaches,
was a burial site for Ndebele kings and leaders.
! It is ironic then that the challenge for rural
communities is how to untangle themselves from
the stigma that pre-colonial activities were evil, and
that certain initiatives are pagan, even though they
contributed to the conservation of natural resources.
! Whereas power in the pre-colonial times guaranteed
access to resources, the colonial and post-colonial
times are characterised by the use of power to deny
people access to, and use of, natural resources.
This is despite the purported attempt of current
community-based initiatives to redress the power
imbalances in controlling land and natural resources.
! The evolution of CBNRM, therefore, has to be
viewed through the democratic processes which are
attempting to devolve power to communities and
engage different actors in co-managing rural resources.
These attempts face bigger challenges of the
privatisation of natural resources. The current system
therefore has to strive to restore the balance of power
relations among government, communities and the
private sector and to enable communities to exercise
certain powers. An important issue is whether
CBNRM is reinforcing the current status of power or
challenging it in the face of the proliferation of PAs
through trans-boundary natural resource management
(TBNRM) schemes. A challenge posed by TBNRM
schemes is the likelihood that they may be stripping
communities of a platform to voice their concerns
with their own governments. Furthermore, the
sovereignty that national governments have over
natural resources could also be threatened.
Origins and processes of modern
CBNRM practices in the southern
Africa region
! The history of conservation demands that southern
Africa continues to move from a scientific and
technical approach of conservation to a more political-
economic approach, which involves taking into
consideration the needs and aspirations of rural
communities. The first phase of this scientific and
technical approach was seen largely in the 194050s,
with legislation concerned with conservation of soils
and harnessing erosion.
! The development of policies allowing the private
sector to utilise wildlife resources are largely meant to
address conflicts between agriculture and wildlife. The
same conditions and tensions have led to a rethink of
the role of rural communities in conservation. Yet
this separation of land and resource policies between
privately-owned land and communal land presents
problems of non-replicability of approaches. On
privately-owned land it was clear to identify who had
proprietorship rights, thus it was easier to transfer
duties and benefits from wildlife resources. On
communally-owned land, this distinction was much
more fuzzy and made the transfer of duties and
benefits more difficult.
! The dual nature of tenure systems brought to bear on
rural resources meant that a different approach had to
be effected on communal land to engage rural
resource users in any meaningful co-managed
conservation initiatives. The lack of clarity over who is
in charge of communal resources has demanded
innovative ways of addressing the issue of access and
use of these resources. This has been approached
through partnerships between communities and
government, and at times with the private sector.
! For communities to be involved in any meaningful
way, governments have to devolve certain powers
and authority over land and natural resources. These
often include the ability of communities to be
involved in monitoring resource use, peer review
through networks, the right to exclude and to utilise.
Yet all these efforts have still not addressed the issue of
governance being top down and the need for
participation by disadvantaged members of the
community.
! Villages should be more equipped to influence policy.
The only way this can be achieved is when villages are
portrayed in a positive and active way. This challenge
has meant that no-one can ever point to a community
that has been truly empowered to manage natural
resources. Local institutions  those meant to be
empowered by the CBNRM initiatives for managing
natural resources  are overshadowed by local
government structures and this has meant that
The southern Africa context: Thematic issues
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governments have held onto certain critical powers
for natural resource management. Whilst it is widely
accepted that further devolution of power and
authority is a central principle of CBNRM, this is not
widespread in application and as a result, the centrist
approach of managing natural resources continues to
enjoy hegemony.
! CBNRM also has to contribute towards the
resolution of land imbalances that are a result of
historical dispossession. In this regard there is need
to address the dualistic environment within which
CBNRM is being implemented. CBNRM needs to be
holistic of rural transformation drives, otherwise it
risks being irrelevant if it is too specialised.
! Implementers of CBNRM also have to avoid offering
it as a panacea to socio-economic upliftment. Research
has shown that examples of CBNRM making a
meaningful contribution in the fight against poverty
are scarce.
Lessons learned from the
philosophy and practice of CBNRM
in southern Africa
! If a resource is valuable and landholders have the
rights to use and benefit from the management of
such a resource, then conservation is likely to benefit.
It is imperative therefore that economic incentives for
the conservation of these resources are put in place so
that those who use the resource derive some benefits.
One way of achieving this is the devolution of
authority from state level to lower levels, including
non-state agencies or government structures carrying
out functions of central government. However, it is
becoming clear that governments are devolving to
commercial interests rather than to communal areas.
This dualistic nature of governing natural resources is
problematic. For communal areas, governments in
southern Africa have continued to limit resource
rights and placed conditions on their use. Thus the
question of what is devolved and to whom becomes
central.
! The central issue in southern African rural
communities is the need to realise that there is
collective proprietorship over natural resources. The
key decision-making issue therefore becomes how
one creates conditions for CBNRM implementation
that acknowledges and is sensitive to the problem of
defining community, without necessarily forcing or
coercing associations among such communities.
Where there are forced associations, conflict has
arisen. A related issue is how to define a jurisdiction
where devolution can be bestowed. It has been
argued that for collective decision making to work,
smaller units are better participatory decision- making
units, but the critical question remains how these
smaller units interact with other smaller units.
! On freehold land the situation is different as the
definition of to whom to confer jurisdiction is clearer.
As a result, the interaction of small units has been a
basis for building blocks for conservation on
neighbouring and adjoining freehold land. Examples
of this include Zimbabwes commercial farming
sector where single units with freehold tenure are
coming together with others to manage a resource
where the aim is to increase efficiency and maximise
returns. But there are more challenges on communal
land and over resources where tenure is not as secure,
and clear, for example on private land. This is linked
invariably to the point of dualism, which presents an
even bigger problem in the non-replicability of
initiatives started on communal land and vice versa.
Security of tenure and clarity over to whom it is
bestowed is important to the success of community
conservation and development.
! Lack of secure tenure on the part of communities also
presents problems for partnerships that include
government, private sector, and communities. There
is therefore a need to reassess tenure security for rural
communities and partnerships where rights are not
clearly and fully defined. This is especially so in the case
of TBNRMs schemes where there are many levels of
partnerships between different governments, private
sector and communities. Any form of potential
partnerships among resource users in such
environments is overridden by certain government
provisions. It is critical in these instances to define
rights fully to avoid the issue of nature conservation
receiving preference ahead of rural livelihoods, and
using that position to dictate what and how land and
natural resources can be used. This has given rise to
situations where rural communities manage animals
when there is resource use, and where animals
become wildlife in the context of tourism.
! A critical point is whether economic benefits receive
preference ahead of tenure security, resource rights,
and social and symbolic value of resources.
Additionally, the lack of a multidimensional
approach to CBNRM has meant that it has failed to
address issues of identity that people attach to land
and resources. This could be a result of the sectoral
nature of the approach  there is a need to widen this
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beyond wildlife and economic benefits. An initiative
in Swaziland has made issues of local identity central
to its conservation and development needs (see Box 2).
Conditions for effective CBNRM
implementation
! In conservation terms, there is need to challenge the
dominant paradigm that subscribes to the view that
PAs are the pinnacle of conservation. The PA
paradigm is in total disregard of effective conservation
outside PAs, yet there is evidence that there is equal if
not more biological diversity outside these areas.
! Should conservation be a moral obligation to
governments and individuals when it is highly
unprofitable? State PAs follow a centralist model, and
an increased role for other stakeholders needs to be
factored in. This is particularly relevant considering
the fact that field staff for PAs increases with the size
of the area being conserved. As a result, costs rise
sharply with size and this has implications for
effective conservation. It becomes important therefore
that there are conditions for successful conservation
outside PAs.
! It is important to understand then that PAs are
another form of commons, but the question is who
are they for, who manages them, how are they used
and how are the benefits from their use or existence
distributed? At the moment it seems that PAs are
thin on local partnerships. There is no indication of
any change from fortress approaches to partnerships.
The impact of regional and
international instruments,
policies, processes and donors on
effective, sustainable and equitable
conservation in southern Africa
! It is critical to view the environment as a resource and
to understand that rural communities are dependent
on natural resources for their livelihoods. Yet their
ability to use and conserve resources is affected by
international instruments. Central conservation
Box 2: Use of indigenous resources and values for poverty
alleviation: The experience of Shewula community, Swaziland
Since 1999 the community of Shewula, Swaziland, has been the centre of projects and initiatives aimed at improving
the quality of life of its population and at alleviating poverty. Shewula is a rural community with a population of 10 000,
stretching over a territory of nearly 15 000 hectares in the Lubombo mountains. The Shewula Trust, a community-
based organisation, has promoted initiatives and projects at Shewula with the support of the Italian non-
governmental organisation, Cospe, and in collaboration with many local and national institutions and agencies. The
projects focus on biodiversity conservation, eco-cultural tourism development and sustainable agriculture. All the
projects and initiatives are part of a comprehensive strategy focused on the mobilisation and use of indigenous
resources and values (natural, socio-cultural, economical, institutional and human).
Shewula is the first Swazi community to set aside part of its communal land (2 650 hectares) to create a nature reserve
as a basis for eco-tourism development and biodiversity conservation. The Shewula Nature Reserve is part of the
Lubombo Conservancy, a 60 000 hectares integrated system of PAs in north-eastern Swaziland. The tourism
programme focuses on the concept of African identity as a peculiar combination of natural and cultural factors to
attract visitors with the offer of a real and integral African experience.  The Shewula Trust is running a community
lodge, the Shewula Mountain Camp, which consists of four traditional huts, one boma (kitchen, dinner-meeting
room-store) and one ablution block, which can accommodate 24 people. The Shewula Mountain Camp is located
on the top of the Lubombo escarpment, with a wonderful view of the savannah landscape. Tourists are offered the
chance of spending a time in a real African community, experiencing nature and its people without any artificial
barrier or division.
Since it started operating in August 2000, the Shewula Mountain Camp has been run as a business, relying on its
own income. A private company, Swazi Trails (a leader of tourism in Swaziland), collaborates with the Shewula
Trust (in marketing and assistance for management). Shewula is also being included in the Afrikatourism network
promoted by the Open Africa Initiative. Important lessons emerging from Shewula are that indigenous resources,
knowledge and values are highly underestimated as a potential for improving peoples livelihoods, and also as actual
conditions that have been securing a dignified quality of life for most of the community. External perception tends
to destroy self-esteem, fostering passivity and weakening capacities for long-term self-reliance. The tendency to
replace indigenous systems and resources  which have been working for hundreds of years, and are deeply rooted
in the culture  with systems and resources imported from outside can prove destructive. Use of local resources and
indigenous knowledge is progressively giving the community a leading role and strengthening capacities for self-
organisation.
Source: Menchini 2003
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issues are biased against rural communities as these
communities are viewed as having a propensity to
degrade the environment.
! International conventions affect local natural resource
management initiatives as such conventions are often
based on singular resources (for example, the Ramsar
Convention on wetlands and CITES on endangered
species). Lately, however, the CBD has been more
holistic in its approach.
! CITESs key objective is the control of trade of species
threatened with survival. It can therefore be
concluded that it does not appreciate the role of
community in CBNRM. It is important here to ask
who has authority over resources when international
instruments are involved. It is clear that international
instruments impose and impact on local efforts to
conserve and utilise resources.
Lessons learnt
Southern Africa has a wealth of lessons on CBNRM
systems that can be drawn on to ensure that communities
benefit from natural resources surrounding them. These
lessons need to be highlighted to enable post-colonial
governments to rethink whether to embrace pre-colonial
aspects of conservation methods or to maintain the
status quo. It was the intention of colonialism to
establish order, a move that is widely regarded to have
disturbed a good system of managing natural resources.
What is needed in the region is to convince world leaders
and PA managers to allow disadvantaged communities
settled next to such PAs to start deriving benefits from
their rich diversity.
Current lessons from the region indicate that the
devolution of power and authority over natural resources
and the ensuing benefits  from the state and individuals
to lower structures  is key but has been inadequate. It
was agreed that devolution of authority over resources to
local communities probably constitutes the single biggest
problem facing the southern African region. The
Mahenye case study (see Box 3) clearly highlights the
benefits of devolving authority to resource users. The case
study also highlights the role of co-management
arrangements that are premised on equal partnership in
resolving conflicts over natural resources.
Effective methods need to be put in place to ensure that
this is achieved for the benefit of all those involved. The
workshop participants recommended that to resolve the
problem, local institutions and communities must be
empowered by statutory instruments that protect them if
they are to have a role in the conservation of natural
resources. It was thus agreed that further devolution of
power and authority over land and natural resources
would additionally empower communities in contributing
to the goals of conservation and development. The
current initiatives, for instance in Zimbabwe where
devolution has been suspended at rural district council
level, where benefits trickling down to the resource users
are minimised and not linked to the duties and
responsibilities over the resource, emphasise the
importance of this issue.
There is a need for new models of PAs to ensure that
communities benefit from resources in those areas. These
models must address the fact that communities closer to
PAs live in deep poverty and their access to those
resources is restricted. New and innovative models for
PAs based on co-management of natural resources
between the state and communities should be premised
on levelling  power relations.
The technical and scientific approaches that characterised
the implementation of PAs in the past are largely enjoying
hegemony in the post-independence period. These
approaches  largely centrist and exclusionary of poor
rural communities  have faced problems in the past and
experiences from the region indicate that, whilst they have
played a part in conservation, they have hardly addressed
issues of social justice and equity. The continued existence
of these approaches should be located within broader,
linked landscapes that take cognisance of multiple uses of
environments. The existence of conservation practices
outside conventional PAs point to the fact that
conservation is not just the preserve of the state; other
actors also play this role, albeit linked to sustainable
livelihoods. The lack of recognition of the broader
linkages between land, natural resources, conservation,
and livelihoods is at the centre of the dispossession of
rural communities access to such resources through the
establishment of PAs. The legacy of this dispossession
can best be understood in the contestations over
authority over land and resources, not only between the
landless and private landowners, but also within PAs.
Further, there are issues around access to and use of land
in the communal areas that are largely connected to the
way PAs were established in the past. The way PAs
continue to be run today has not addressed this
important question, or where attempts have been made,
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it has often been too late. An example of this is the Chitsa
land dispute in south-east Zimbabwe, on the border
with the Gonarezhou National Park.
Experiences of communal property associations in
South Africa are premised on restoring land rights to
communities that were dispossessed of such access but
also promoting natural resource management. This
clearly highlights the fact that establishment of a clear
rights framework with commensurate responsibilities
must be defined and agreed to, for example, the
Makuleke community and the Kruger National Park.
What is emerging from the Makuleke experience is that
establishment of institutional reform of PAs and
community governance is necessary for co-management
to be successful. In short, decisions on natural resources
Box 3: Mahenye co-management arrangements:
Local community, private sector and government
As a result of the establishment of the Gonarezhou National Park in south-eastern Zimbabwe, local people were
dispossessed of access to land and natural resources. This led to poaching by the Mahenye community. In 1982, in
one fortnight alone, there were 80 convictions of poaching against the community, showing open antagonism
towards the park. A local safari operator, Mr Clive Stockil, brokered an agreement between the Department of
National Parks and Wildlife Management and the Mahenye people. Mr Stockil could shoot a small quota of elephant
and buffalo crossing from the park into the community. The people would receive the meat and the revenue in
exchange for no poaching. Mr Stockil sold the quota to safari hunting clients. Over time the hunting quota was
increased and the communitys earnings grew. The community reorganised their villages, moving some families
away from prime hunting areas, and increased the amount of land allocated to wildlife. The community used the
money to develop a number of community projects. This was the experience that gave the department the
confidence to take the far-reaching decision to devolve the authority over wildlife to the district level in communal
areas, as the institution for the operationalisation of Campfire.  The governments positive response led to policy
changes providing for:
! devolution of state control over wildlife to the locals through district councils
! devolution of decision making from the state to the local level
! devolution of costs and benefits from the state to the local level, leading to internalisation of costs and benefits
at the local level
! institution building at the community level, community empowerment and community participation
! market access for wildlife products.
Land use planning and management activities  The community set aside 15 000ha of wilderness as a wildlife
conservancy. Other management activities carried out by the community include fire control, game capture and
relocation, provision of game water supplies and resource monitoring. The community is responsible for setting
their trophy hunting quotas. Safari hunting operations are carried out on the community land. The community also
promulgates bylaws as a means of enforcing community management decisions.
Joint venture with the private sector  The Mahenye community went into a partnership with the Zimbabwe Sun
Group of Hotels (ZimSun), in forming an enterprise based on the construction of two upmarket lodges, namely
Chilo and Mahenya. The community leased the land to ZimSun and the company invested up to Z$60 million. This
enterprise alone provides some 70 jobs to the community. The agreement also stipulates that 15% of the gross
revenue of the enterprise goes to the community.  The lodges conduct tours into the neighbouring park as well as
photographic safaris on the west bank of the Save river. Marketing of wildlife products is done by the private sector.
The rural district council enters into lease agreements with safari operators who sell the hunts and manage the
hunting clientele. Eco-tourism marketing is the responsibility of the ZimSun.
Source: Machena & Matinhire 2003
Box 4: Wildlife-based land reform as a way to resolve conflicts
In south-east Zimbabwe a local community has invaded part of a PA to force the government to address a long-
standing land dispute. The governments response has been to propose resolving the conflict through wildlife-
based land reform. This points to the potential that the current state of community conservation and development
initiatives in southern Africa has to address issues of community autonomy around the land question.
Source: Woolmer, Chaumba & Scoones 2003
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and their use should not just be oriented towards
achieving state goals of conservation, but also towards
meeting socio-economic needs. This case clearly indicates
that there are opportunities for strengthening PA and
community relationships if the tradeoffs are fair and
equitable.
Where the planning of the PA is done without the
community in mind  for example, the setting up of part
of the Limpopo National Park in Mozambique   local
access and use rights are likely to be undermined. In
addition, a centralised management approach weakens
linkages among institutions asserting some authority
over resources and within the landscapes. This manifests
itself in challenges within proprietorship boundaries.
Lessons from the region also highlight that there are
multiple motives, not just financial, for CCAs. Further,
the dominance of outside agents, and the concomitant
lack of recognition of CCAs by government, donors and
non-governmental organisations  (NGOs) has a negative
impact on CCAs (see Chidhakwa case study, Box 1).
Summary of
recommendations
An underlying consensus informed the deliberations of
the workshop  that the concepts and structures that
guided parks development in the 20th century are
inadequate for the challenges of the 21st century. Parks
constituencies and purposes are rapidly changing and if
they are to have a significant place in southern Africas
future politico-economic map, these changes must be
addressed. It was recognised that the findings of the
workshop had relevance for a number of the WPC
streams and it was hoped that they would be taken into
consideration in the various debates concerned. The
findings have particular salience for the governance
stream.
The workshop thus warmly endorsed TILCEPAs
proposals to add a governance dimension to the IUCNs
list of PA categories, including CCAs and CMPAs.
Noting from southern Africas extensive experience in
CBNRM that CCAs are institutionally inhibited by a lack
of proprietary devolution, the workshop recommended
that these be given the formal recognition and
entitlements essential for their effective management.
Noting that the active involvement of those living in and
around PAs can enhance both conservation and
development objectives, the workshop recommended
that PA goals and structures should be reviewed to
achieve this synergy, and that CMPAs be further
developed on the basis of negotiated formal agreements
between parks management and neighbouring authorities
regarding reciprocal responsibilities and benefits.
The workshop thus specifically recommended that the
goals and governance structures of official, state-declared
PAs be reviewed to better contribute to the objectives of
society at large and to enhance local livelihoods,
governance and economic development. It was further
agreed that state-declared PAs should provide residents
and neighbours with full legitimacy and status in co-
management governance structures. At the same time,
CMPAs should function as subsidiary decision-making
units, uniting legitimate stakeholders, internalising costs
and benefits and sharing them fairly through institutional
mechanisms, rights and contractual obligations.
In order for CCAs and CMPAs to be successful there is
need to address certain approaches to conservation. This
should, firstly, lead to the recognition of the role played
by communities in conservation  conferring rights and
responsibilities on such communities to benefit from the
role they play in conservation must complement this
recognition. Secondly, governments, donors and
conservationists must create an enabling policy
environment to allow the evolution of CMPAs and the
continued development of CCAs. Additionally, policy
must be supported with clear legislation and guidelines.
Devolution must lead to an understanding by the state
and other actors of who they are actually negotiating with.
It became clear in the workshop deliberations that the
categorisation and distinction of CCAs and CMPAs is
key. Salient to both categories was that devolution is
crucial for conservation and production to be successful.
It is critical to note that with CMPAs devolution has a
different arrangement  the state has a clearly defined
body that negotiates and as such, rights, benefit sharing,
and partnerships should be based on negotiated rights
and responsibilities. With CCAs, recognition of local
communities as the major players with authority in
decision making on the management of the natural
resources is key. The role such communities play should
be acknowledged and appreciated through devolution of
authority over natural resources.
What also emerged in the discussions of PAs as common
property was an opportunity to redefine parks completely.
The discussions at the workshop began highlighting
from a historical perspective that conservation is not just
the preserve of the state but there are other actors who
have played and continue to play this role.
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Issues Recommendations Recommendations
for ccas for cmpas
Should not intervene if there is something that
works (policy is to protect and create an
enabling environment for conditions to
evolve). External interventions should only be
carried out by request and on local conditions.
There is need for confirmation of real and
procedural rights to land and other natural
resources, coupled with a statutory protection
for local institutions.
Benefits should not be defined simply in
economic terms, but go beyond this to
encompass the meaning of land, culture, social
and symbolic relations. Distribution of
benefits should be determined by the CCA
itself and subject to community consensus.
Devolution is generally desirable, starting from
full recognition of local actors. The process
should arise organically instead of being led by
the state. Indicators of success should be
defined by communities. Devolution is a nec-
essary condition for robust CCA development.
If de jure devolution is not possible, build on
increments of de facto devolution.
Should be agreed to between neighbours, both
community-community and community-state
neighbours.
Capacities develop primarily through
experimentation and experience.
Capacity building is a process requiring long
time-frames and this should be reflected in
state and other interventions.
External inputs to capacity building are
required in technical aspects, that is,  resource
inventories, off-take quotes, fiscal
management, marketing.
For learning to occur experiments must be
monitored and adapted. Monitoring should
be in accordance with indicators of success
drawn and defined by communities. Various
CCAs should be acting collaboratively and
government should assist them with a
marketing strategy.
A wide range of possibilities exist with adjacent
CCAs, private individual proprietorial units,
private sector business entities. Basis for
partnership should be a negotiated agreement
premised on reciprocity among the partners.
Partnerships should promote equity around
issues of rights, knowledge, capital, decision-
making powers and returns to investment.
Should be internal to the community itself 
so that they are not the recipients of a policy









Should promote and secure equitable
partnerships where a CMPA is established.
Rights and obligations of all stakeholders
should be clearly documented and clarified.
Clear rights framework commensurate with
responsibilities should be agreed to.
Should be a negotiated deal. Benefits should
accompany responsibilities. Benefits should
not only be negotiated, but also be subject to
re-negotiation periodically. 
Devolution must lead to an understanding by
the state and other actors of who they are
actually negotiating with. Devolution defines
the non-state partners. Decision-making
should be oriented towards resource users
instead of the state. Community participation
and representation structures and systems
should be clearly defined and flexible.
Should be the product of fair negotiation
among the management partners. Boundaries
should be negotiated and balance conservation
and development goals.
Capacities develop primarily through
experimentation and experience.
Capacity building is a process requiring long
time-frames.
External inputs to capacity building are required
in technical aspects, that is, resource
inventories, off-take quotes, fiscal
management, marketing.
For learning to occur, experiments must be
monitored and adapted. Monitoring should
be in accordance with indicators of success
defined by all management partners. PAs
should have a comprehensive marketing
strategy.
Negotiation should lead to fairness and
partnership can only result if there is fairness.
Local partners should be socially recognised,
legitimate partners. Basis for partnership
should be negotiated agreement premised on
reciprocity.
Should be fair and transparent.
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At the same time, discussion of community in communal
lands should address the issue of land. The workshop
thus pointed to the need for conservation to address the
historical inequities in land use and ownership.
Communal land is state land even where there are
community conservation and development initiatives.
There was thus a strong recommendation that issues of
land need to be teased out and community autonomy
around issues of land needs to be worked towards.
The workshop drafted a specific set of recommendations
for both CCAs and CMPAs, which is provided in
summary in the table on page 17.
Participants further recommended that local institutions
should be accorded statutory protection for their
involvement in conservation issues. Policy makers and
practitioners should recognise and support the multiple
motives for community conservation  that communities
have multiple uses of environments. Where partnerships
are being promoted, they should be structured to
promote equity, rights, knowledge, capital, decision-
making powers and returns on investment.
The workshop also called for PAs to be located within
landscapes as positive economic and ecological actors 
not viewed in a narrow sense, but at a much broader area
beyond the actual space. A PAs plan should be located in
a landscape and the type of goal for conservation and
other needs agreed on. As such, PA authorities should
form strong alliances with community-based organisations
(CBOs) based on a balance of conservation and
development goals.
Workshop participants fully supported the need to
establish CMPA arrangements between communities
and the state or private landholders where these do not
already exist. In these arrangements, the rights and
obligations of all stakeholders in the arrangement must
be clearly understood and documented. This requires the
establishment of a supportive policy framework with
provisions for community capacity building and conflict-
management processes. There should be capacity
building at all stages of co-management  that is, during
negotiations, signing of the agreement, to understand the
final agreement, and implementation of the agreement.
The establishment of a clear rights framework with
commensurate responsibilities must be clearly defined
and agreed on. Community participation and
representation structures and systems should be clearly
defined and flexible. Establishment of institutional
reform of PAs and community governance is imperative
for co-management to be successful.
The essential requirement for communities entering into
effective co-management with state PAs or managing
resources on their own lands is that such communities
should have full authority over their lands and natural
resources. The approach to management should be
holistic, adaptive and should recognise the full spectrum
of potential benefits.
As presented earlier, the workshop drafted a statement
on CCAs and CMPAs, which was undertaken to give a
sharp and explicit focus to core recommendations.
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Introduction
Most contemporary commentators have tended to
romanticise pre-colonial conservation practices. There is a
dearth of information about these practices, although
available evidence does indicate that as pre-colonial society
became first regimented then stratified, access to and use
of natural resources also came to be stratified, and
conservation practices reflect the attempts to balance
competing interests. Such recorded pre-colonial
conservation practices as the demarcation of sacred areas,
the allocation of totems, the expropriation of labour for
conservation, and so on, did not necessarily reflect
egalitarian and consensual conservation, but rather the
exercise of power over people and resources by dominant
clans or classes, as the case would have been.
Very little is known and has been written about pre-
colonial conservation practices in the region. The general
belief is that low population densities, unsophisticated
agricultural and hunting practices, and immobile
populations meant that ecological conservation tended to
be built into the routine economic, social and religious
activities of the era. Consequently, pre-colonial societies
did not need to develop sophisticated conservation
mechanisms. The reality tends to be very different.
Existing evidence suggests that settlements typically were
consolidated with very high population densities.
Agricultural and other resource extraction activities were
very sophisticated and adapted to the requirements of
specific resources and ecosystems over time, while the
societies themselves developed sometimes very
sophisticated mechanisms to regulate resource use.
The assumption of stable pre-colonial populations is
wrong. In very early times, evidence exists to suggest that
when resources came under pressure from, say,
increased human populations, or economic activity, a
typical response was for whole populations to move to
new un-colonised and resource-abundant areas. These
political responses to ecological phenomena resulted in
the several waves of migrations from central into
southern Africa and back, including the Luba-Lunda
dispersions and the Mfecane of the late 18th century. As
this response became restricted by widespread settlements,
new political, religious and technological innovations
were developed to deal with ecological concerns. These
included such innovations as pastoralism, slash and burn
agriculture, water harvesting, and the development of
institutional regulation of resource use.
In the area of wildlife, for instance, much evidence exists
to demonstrate that because of technological limitations
indigenous hunter-gatherers did not adversely affect the
populations, especially of big game. Although meat
constituted an important part of local diets and wildlife
products constituted important commodities, trading
did not deplete existing wildlife populations. Thus by the
time the great adventurers (essentially European hunter-
gatherers) in the mould of Henry Morton Stanley, or the
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missionaries, in the form of the Moffats and Livingstone,
arrived in the region, they could report that the region was
teaming with wildlife, that the forest were dense and
unscathed, and that the landscape was generally pristine.
Fortman and Nhira (1992) detail various other ways 
including the setting up of sacred groves, ritual and myth
 by which local communities managed scarce resources.
Schoffeleers (1979) discusses the complex relationship
between communities and their environment, and the
various institutional mechanisms developed by these
communities to manage natural resources. Matowanyika
(1991) describes some important aspects of Shona
ethnography and environmental management and
concludes that while colonialism attempted to replace
African with European institutions for environmental
management, African institutions did not dissipate but
continued to function because of basic and fundamental
differences in perceptions and uses of the environment
between the colonisers and the colonised.
This paper explores the evolution and development of
pre-colonial and colonial conservation practices and
attempts to demonstrate their influences on
contemporary conservation policies and practices. A
long-term historical approach is used, and for the most
part the case of Zimbabwe is the primary point of
reference, although examples from other parts of the
region are used wherever necessary. This is because the
history of conservation in most of southern Africa




Because of obvious problems with the predominant
historical methodologies, it is difficult to describe with
any precision the conservation practices that could have
existed in pre-colonial times. However, as Matowanyika
(1991) argues, certain important elements of pre-colonial
ethnography and environmental management survived
into the colonial period because of their continued
relevance to the environmental management practices of
the colonised peoples. Historians, sociologists,
anthropologists and other students of non-industrial
societies have emphasised the close relationship between
social organisation and the environment. They have also
observed that the process of ecological transformation of
nature forms a major element in the religious systems of
any society with a subsistence economy.
A great deal has been written about the notion of
sacredness and its role in conservation. For example,
sacred groves are seen as representing important pre-
colonial forest conservation, while sacred pools are related
to wetlands conservation, and so on. While there can be
no doubt that religion was certainly deployed to conserve
critical resources, particularly in times of crisis, it appears
that sacred places represented much broader religious
goals and functions than conservation.
Perhaps the most comprehensive studies of pre-colonial
conservation practices as they existed during the colonial
era in central and southern Africa have occurred in the
context of studies of religion. This is not surprising since
conservation would not have existed as a separate
discipline per se, but as part of general social organisation.
As Schoffeleers states, [T]he prevalent idiom used by
central African societies for the articulation and
application of their earth philosophies is religion
(1979:2). Schofelleers further notes that territorial cults are
distinct from other religious organisations in society in
terms of their high degree of institutionalisation, their
reflection of the power and primacy of political
organisations over kin groups, and historical continuity.
Given that population densities were generally low
compared to resources, and also that resource exploitation
was designed to fulfil immediate consumption needs
and only limited exchange values, natural resources were
not commoditised in the pre-colonial era. Consequently,
early conservation ideals were developed to deal with crisis
situations arising out of natural disasters, rather than
from the extractive activities of humans. Thus most
regulation of resource use revolved around the
implications of particular forms of resource extraction for,
say, droughts, floods and pestilence.
Schoffeleers (1979) notes that cults function to regulate
the production and distribution of food, the protection
of natural resources, and the control of human migratory
movements. Ecological functions are distributed through
a number of these religious institutions, including lineage
cults concerned inter alia with land and livestock issues,
professional cults of hunters, fishermen and others, and
territorial cults which are profoundly ecological in
function. Territorial cults function in respect of the well
being of the community, its fields, livestock, fishing,
hunting and general economic interests. They achieve
these objectives through ritual as well as issuing and
enforcing directives.
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As colonialism progressed, territorial cults came under
various challenges, which eventually led to their
breakdown. These challenges included:
! land expropriation and wage labour which drastically
changed the structure of social organisation
! Christianity, which questioned the religious bases of
the cults
! the colonial administration itself; the rationalist
interpretations of ecology in the form of land
conservation and animal husbandry
! the bureaucratisation of the chieftainship, which
weakened political support for the cults.
As a consequence of these pressures, by the 1950s the
territorial cults had greatly diminished in importance
(Schoffeleers 1979).
The role of indigenous technical knowledge systems in
pre-colonial conservation has also been considerably
studied (Matowanyika 1989). Local communities
developed intimate knowledge of their ecosystems and
used this knowledge to tailor systems of sustainable
resource use and management that were appropriate to
these systems. Local resource users developed intimate
knowledge of the ecological status of the resources, rates
of reproduction, rates of sustainable off-take, as well as
forms of sustainable off-take. Numerous examples can
be adduced from local myths and religions to
demonstrate the ways in which indigenous knowledge
was deployed and reinforced in religion to regulate
resource use. Thus traditional healers developed
regulations around the harvesting of medicinal plants,
some of which are still in force to this day; hunters, fishers
and pastoralists all developed highly complex resource-
use regulatory systems based on the productive and
reproductive capacities of the resources in question.
However, pre-colonial conservation practices were not
only regulated in the religious realm with reference to local
use. The pre-colonial state also took steps to regulate
resource use by outsiders, especially if such use was
perceived to be affecting sustainability.
It is significant that pre-colonial conservation, based as it
was on the unity of humanity and nature, did not create
separate categories for conservation, but rather devised
strategies for conserving nature while at the same time
guaranteeing access to it. Although this access and use
may have been mitigated by policy, religion, custom and
practice to reflect existing stratification and other
imbalances in pre-colonial society, the motivation for
conservation was to guarantee human access to nature.
This was in direct contrast with the colonial model of
conservation, which has led to the development of nature
conservation areas, where human use of resources and
settlement were highly restricted. Colonial conservation
was based on a myth of nature, which emerged from the
scientific processes of exploration, mapping,
documentation, classification and analysis. Nature came
to be defined as the absence of human impact, especially
European human impact. Nature thus came to define




According to Adams (2003), colonialism can be seen as an
outworking of bureaucratic rationalisation. This rationality
has four dimensions, all of which were features of
colonial states:
! the development of science and technology and its
deployment to manipulate nature
! the expansion of the capitalist economy
! formal hierarchical organization (the creation of
executive government, transforming social action
into rationally organised action)
! the elaboration of a formal legal system (Adams
2003:22).
This rationality assumed that the cultural and the social
could be uncoupled from nature, since reason had
allowed humanity to escape from nature and to remake it:
The acquisition of colonies was accompanied by, and to a
large extent enabled by, a profound belief in the
possibility of restructuring nature and re-ordering it to
serve human needs and desires (Adams 2003: 23).
Science was the mechanism by which this could be
achieved, and science and conservation developed hand in
hand.
It is now generally agreed that European colonisation
colonised not only humans, but nature as well
(Plumwood 2003). In direct contrast to the African
intuition regarding the unity between nature and society,
colonial ideas about nature were based in the European
Enlightenments dualism between humans and nature.
In this construction, nature is seen as a resource for
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human use, and wildness as a challenge for the rational
mind to conquer (Adams 2003). European colonisation
itself was based on the application of rationalist ideology
to both humans and nature. In this ideology, indigenous
peoples and their lands are portrayed as areas of rational
deficit  unused, empty, and under-used. Thus the
imposition of European rationality on this irrational
landscape is justified through a form of anthropocentrism,
which sees indigenous cultures as primitive and less
rational. The colonisation of nature thus relies on a range
of conceptual strategies that are employed also within the
human sphere to support supremacism of nation,
gender (the white male) and race (Plumwood 2003).
According to Plumwood, these human/nature dualist
anthropocentric conceptual strategies, which exaggerate
differences while at the same time denying commonalities
between humans and nature, include:
! Radical exclusion: This functions to mark out the
Other for separate and inferior treatment. Nature is
treated as Other, and humans are separated from
nature and animals. Nature is a separate lower order,
lacking any real continuity with the human. At the
same time, the colonising groups associate themselves
with mastery of nature.
! Homogenisation/stereotyping:  The Other is not
an individual, but a member of a stereotyped class,
thus making it interchangeable, replaceable and
homogenous. Nature is treated as interchangeable
units, as resources. Radical exclusion and
homogenisation work together to produce a
polarised understanding in which human and non-
human spheres correspond to two quite different
substances or orders of being in the world.
! Polarisation: Radical exclusion and homogenisation
work together to produce a polarised understanding
in which overlap between the human and non-
human spheres are denied and discouraged. Nature is
only nature if it is pure, uncontaminated by human
influence, as untouched wilderness, while human
identity is separate from and outside of nature.
! Denial, backgrounding: Once the Other is marked
as separated and inferior, there is strong motivation
to represent them as inessential. In ecology, the
colonised are firstly denied as uncivilised. Their prior
ownership of the land is denied, and their land is seen
as terra nullius  with no pre-existing regimes of rights
to it. Nature is seen as a basically inessential
constituent of the universe
! Assimilation: The colonised are devalued as lacking
the colonisers essential quality  reason. Differences
are judged as deficiencies, and therefore as grounds of
inferiority. The order of the colonised is represented
as disorder. Thus the colonised and their disorderly
space are available for assimilation and use by the
coloniser. Similarly, the intricate order of nature is
presented as disorder, to be replaced by human order
in development.
! Instrumentalism: The colonised Other is reduced to
being a means of the colonisers ends. The extent to
which indigenous peoples were ecological agents who
actively managed the land is denied, and they are
presented as largely passive in the face of nature. In
ecology, natures agency and independence are denied,
subsumed in, or remade to coincide with human
interests. Since the non-human sphere is empty of
purpose and devoid of agency of its own, it is
appropriate that the human coloniser impose his
own purposes.
Thus, it is significant that the definition of places as wild
played an equally important part in pre- and post-colonial
conservation. While pre-colonial notions of wild were
applied to abandoned places or places untouched by
human use, the same notion was used in colonial
conservation through the suppression of knowledge of
the extent and scope of human occupation in a process of
creating ideologically significant landscapes (Adams
2003). In colonial conservation, ideology replaced religion
as the basis of conservation practices:
The colonial period saw a distinctive pattern of
engagement with nature: a destructive, utilitarian and
cornucopian view of the feasibility of yoking nature to
economic gain (Adams 2003:22).
Discussing the declaration of Matopos National Park in
Rhodesia from 1926, Adams demonstrates how, by
recognising ancient hunter-gatherer occupations of
Matopos but dismissing contemporary agricultural
activity, depopulating the park and restricting access to
tourists and officials, a white Rhodesian shrine  sacred to
the memory of Cecil John Rhodes who was buried there
 was created in a place that was formerly a shrine of the
Mwari cult.
While early colonial ideas about nature conservation grew
partially out of a desire to tame the wild (Adams 2003), as
exemplified by the collection, naming and deposition of
specimens in museums and other attempts to master
wildness (Griffiths 1996), as well as social reaction against
technology and industrialisation, environmental historians
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have noted that the major impetus for colonial
conservation has its origins in the general opposition to
the impacts of the excesses of utilitarian resource
exploitation, as well as  perceptions of rapid environmental
degradation in the colonies (Grove 1995). Thus colonial
conservation has its origins in both a romantic tradition
opposed to modernisation, as well as a scientific rational
tradition that sought to manage nature for human
enjoyment and benefit (Adams 2003:8).
Hughes notes how this myth of the wild continues to be
used to justify contemporary conservation policies and
practices, even when they are applied to landscapes that are
themselves the result of human agency (pers. comm.
2003). Citing the examples of Lake Kariba, a massive
man-made lake on the Zambezi valley, and the Chewore/
Mana Pools National Park complex downstream of it,
Hughes observes how these recent human creations are





Rhodesia and the Cape
Colony
This section traces the historical development of game
legislation in the Cape Colony and Southern Rhodesia as
the basis for subsequent wildlife and natural resource
conservation policies and practices throughout the
region. The case of Southern Rhodesia is presented, with
examples adduced from elsewhere as appropriate. Early
colonial game legislation was based on the creation of
separate spaces for conservation.
Game legislation in the colonies was essentially a reaction
to the depletion of the hitherto abundant game resources
of these areas by white hunters, missionaries, adventurers
and engineers armed with high-precision rifles (MacKenzie
1987, 1988; Mapuvire 1987). Stories of the early
adventurers abound with tales of huge bags of trophies
collected for sale in Europe (Masona 1987). Initially, ivory
was the primary object of the chase  ostrich feathers,
rhino horn, hippo teeth and meat and hides were of
secondary importance. In the 19th century, hunting came
to focus on the collection of specimens for sale to natural
museums and zoological gardens in Europe ( Mapuvire
1987; MacKenzie 1988). Adams observes that the
plundering of nature was a widespread feature of
colonisation, particularly in its pioneer form (2003: 29).
Hunting and early colonial game
legislation
As detailed by MacKenzie (1987, 1988), hunting
subsidised the advance of imperialism in different
phases. In the first phase, professional hunter-traders,
adventurers and explorers undertook hunting for trade in
trophies in Europe. In this phase, missionaries,
prospectors, explorers and engineers (particularly railway
builders) also undertook hunting to subsidise their
activities. The famous missionary, David Livingstone,
built his church at Kolobeng and paid his followers with
the gun.
Thus, in the second phase of the imperial advance,
hunting subsidised the activities of the early settlers.
Game constituted a resource  providing meat, a means
of paying for labour and other items for trade. As settlers
built up herds of livestock, the balance between
pastoralism and hunting shifted towards the former. It
was no longer in the settlers interests to have
competition for grazing, and so wildlife was shot out as
vermin.
As the depletion of game stocks became increasingly
acute, game legislation was introduced with the aim of
preserving the remaining species and providing limited
access to these species for the white elite.
Early game legislation established proprietorial rights to
wild animals in relation to land ownership, and
introduced a licensing system, the effect of which was to
turn hunting into an elite recreation.
Game laws were also passed for aesthetic and moral
reasons, and the need to preserve flora and fauna for
posterity (Street 1970, in Masona 1987). Colonial
conservation allowed resources to be appropriated, both
for the use of private capital as a source of revenue for and
the state itself (Adams 2003). Early colonial legislation in
Rhodesia was imported from the Cape of Good Hope,
which, in turn, had been exported from Britain. British
game legislation was itself based on the Magna Carta of
1215, itself based on Roman common law which
established that game was res nullius, that is, the property
of no-one, not even the state. Thus in the Magna Carta,
game was held by the king:
in his sovereign capacity in sacred trust for the people.
Therefore, it follows that an individual cannot obtain an
absolute property right in such game except upon such
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conditions, restrictions and limitations as may be permitted
by the state (Leopold, quoted in Masona 1987).
This was the basis of the Kings Game or Royal Game
concept that was to become such a pervasive feature of
game policies in southern Africa.
Game legislation in southern Rhodesia began in 1889
with the granting of the Charter of Incorporation to the
British South Africa Company (BSAC) by the British
government. Seeking to streamline the chain of
command between the former and the latter, the Charter
made the laws of the Cape of Good Hope applicable to
the colony of Southern Rhodesia (Masona 1987). The
policy of game preservation was written into the Charter.
Initially these laws applied only to Matebeleland, but were
extended to Mashonaland in 1898 when the colony of
Southern Rhodesia was proclaimed (Masona 1987).
Owners and occupiers of alienated land were exempt
from these laws. From the outset, colonial game
legislation introduced a class and racial character to the
exploitation of game by limiting access to owners of land,
who could only be the European settlers. Game
legislation was imposed on the BSAC in the Charter by
the imperial state. The policy was not the result of the
experiences of the BSAC in Southern Rhodesia, neither
did it in any way reflect the aspirations of the indigenous
population of the colony (Mapuvire 1987).
By proclamation of the High Commissioner on June 10,
1891, the law in force in the Cape of Good Hope became
the law of the colony of Southern Rhodesia. In terms of
this proclamation, the Game Law Amendment Act of
1886 of the Cape of Good Hope became the official game
law of Southern Rhodesia. This law detailed the process
of acquiring licenses and permits and their use on
privately owned or occupied land. It further sought to
curtail the export of game from the Cape and to prevent
the commercialisation of game exploitation (Masona
1987). The beginnings of a preservationist game policy in
Southern Rhodesia were contained in this early
legislation.
In 1899 a Game Preservation Ordinance No 6 was passed
to consolidate and amend the Game Laws for the better
preservation of game in Southern Rhodesia. The
Ordinance marked the introduction of profound changes
in colonial game policy and these are outlined and
discussed below. The Ordinance divided game into two
classes, A and B for purposes of licensing. A class A
licence cost one pound and was valid during a shooting
season, (a closed season having been set at 1 October to
30 April of the following year). For the shooting of class
B game, permission of the Administrator was necessary
and this was granted only to holders of game licences.
The Ordinance further declared elephant, giraffe,
hippopotamus, white rhino, eland, zebra, Burchells
zebra, quagga, kudu or ostrich, royal game and prohibited
their killing, hunting, pursuit or capture, unless they were
required for bona fide scientific or farming purposes. A
game licence would cost ten pounds and would be sold
to holders of a magistrates certificate stating that the
applicant was suitable to hold such licence. The privileges
of owners or occupiers of alienated land were left intact.
For the first time, the Ordinance provided for the legal
protection of species from hunting. Albeit this protection
was for a limited period of time (five years), the guiding
principle was that a threatened species could be protected
for sufficiently long periods of time, within designated
areas, to allow for population to build up, after which
exploitation could resume.
The game preservation phase
(19231960)
The preservation phase, associated with the early
attempts at game legislation and the establishment of
(game) reserves, was part of the transformation of
hunting into the sport of an elite. Species would survive
and game would be protected in order to supply recreation
to those qualified [by race and class] to pursue it
(MacKenzie 1988: 23).
The Game Law Consolidation Ordinance of 1906 was
the first amendment to the pre-1923 game legislation
and already contained elements of the racial appropriation
of nature by the new settler regime (Masona 1987). The
amendment was occasioned by an application by a white
landowner for a permit for his African employees to shoot
game on his ranch. The permit was refused on the grounds
that an African employee could not be the agent of a white
landowner as intended in the legislation. The amendment
also prohibited the shooting of game at night. This
resulted in serious opposition from the settler
community who argued:
We must make up our minds whether we are going to
keep this colony as a game reserve or whether we are going
to make it a colony of white people (Southern
Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates vol 5
(1926) col. 411, quoted in Masona 1987:34).
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Again, this opposition by landowners stemmed from
the perception of wildlife as a nuisance and a cost to
agriculture that could not be tolerated.
In 1929 the colonial government shifted its efforts to
preserve wildlife into higher gear through the
promulgation of the Game and Fish Preservation Act 35
of 1929. The Act was passed to  Consolidate and
amend the law for the better preservation of game and fish
and the protection of certain of the fauna of Southern
Rhodesia (emphasis added). In terms of this Act, the
Governor of the Colony could establish game reserves
and appoint game wardens and rangers to manage these
reserves. In the same year, the Southern Rhodesia
government also established the first game reserve and
national park in the country (the Matopo Game Reserve
and National Park). This was intended to preserve all
species of flora and fauna occurring in the designated area,
which would be protected for scientific, educational and
aesthetic purposes.
Rethinking the excesses of the
vermin policy and free shooting:
Game protection and the
establishment of game reserves
While in the early years of colonial rule game had been
shot to make way for the developing cattle industry, this
soon resulted in declines in the game populations. Game
policies were designed to preserve wildlife to sustain the
sport hunting activities of the settler elite. However,
even such activities were threatened by the eradication of
game. Thus it became necessary to enforce game
protection measures that would ensure the survival of a
pool of wild animals to sustain these activities. However,
as has already been stated, initial game preservation laws
were aimed at protecting specific species in designated
areas for limited periods of time.
In 1923, after the granting of responsible government to
the colony, a research programme was set up to determine
trends in the population dynamics of the game
population of the colony. The actual surveys were carried
out by native commissioners who assessed the
populations of the various species of wildlife in their
areas. Not surprisingly, in most districts the game
populations were found to be extremely low, with some
species being reported to have disappeared altogether
(Tarutira 1987).
By this time, pressure was increasing for the establishment
of a game reserve in the colony to halt the fast
disappearance of flora and fauna. The conservationist
lobby, represented by the Wildlife Protection Society of
Southern Rhodesia, was a major pressure group for the
establishment of game reserves. The main objective of
this Society was the preservation of wildlife with due
regard to the economic and agricultural interests of the
country (Tarutira 1987). The economic and agricultural
interests of the country obviously referred to the
economic and agricultural interests of the settler economy
(to the exclusion of the indigenous population), and
therefore to the protection of these interests where they
conflicted with wildlife. The Society generally agreed with
the game laws in force, but was dissatisfied with the
administration and enforcement of the legislation.
Commenting on the occurrence of night shooting,
trapping and fish dynamiting  all banned activities which
nonetheless were continuing unabated  the honorary
secretary of the Wildlife Society of Southern Rhodesia
wrote in a circular letter:
... the whole thing forces one to ask if we have any
feelings, aspirations or thoughts beyond tobacco, gold,
mines, mealies, base metals commerce or LSD  (quoted
in Tarutira 1988).
Ironically, the same Wildlife Society claimed that game
meat was not appropriate food for Africans, despite the
fact that the settlers (hunters, missionaries, farmers and
so on) had made extensive use of game for exactly this
purpose.
Thus the primary motivation of the Society in agitating
for a tightening of the game laws and preservation was
precisely in order to preserve wild animals for the benefit
of the Europeans. Thus the enjoyment of game meat had
to be a by-product of sport hunting which the game laws
were specifically designed to exclude the African from:
in effect, game meat was to be subjected to sumptuary
laws; it could be eaten only by those who treated hunting
as sport; African labour time was not to be devoted to its
pursuit  (MacKenzie 1988:23)
A change in government policy soon occurred with the
passing of the 1929 Game and Fish Preservation Act
which, inter alia, granted the government power to
establish game parks. Thus the original game reserves
were established by ministerial decree and could also be
de-proclaimed, and most people thought they would be
temporary. However, by 1931, a total of 5 780 square
miles of land had been declared permanent game
sanctuaries in the following areas:
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! Matopo National Park (reserved in 1926)  350 square
miles
! Wankie Game Reserve (reserved in 1928)  5 142
square miles
! Victoria Falls Game Reserve (reserved in 1930)  210
square miles
! Kazuma Pan Game Reserve (reserved in 1931)  76
square miles.
There was also, however, considerable opposition to the
establishment of game reserves, especially from the cattle
lobby, that is, the representatives of the cattle farmers of
the colony. Thus, for example, the establishment of a
game reserve at Chipinda Pools in the south-eastern
lowveld was opposed by farmers in that area for fear that
it would engender the spread of tsetse and thereby
threaten the viability of the cattle industry there. However,
the Victoria Publicity Association strongly campaigned
for the game reserve on the basis that it would stimulate
tourism in the province. They were strongly supported by
the Umtali Publicity Association who figured that the
game reserve would attract tourists to the town of
Mutare. The Gona-Re-Zhou Game Reserve was
eventually proclaimed in 1934 in the Chipinda Pools area.
Smallholders also resisted the establishment of game
reserves, especially since most entailed their relocation
from areas designated game reserves. Boundary disputes
between the smallholders and the Department of
National Parks still occur to this day, with colonial and
pre-colonial claims to land designated national parks
being reasserted in many areas.1
The establishment of these game reserves was not
without cost. Numerous Africans were displaced by the
new game reserves and relocated into the already crowded
reserves. Thus, for instance, the proclamation of the
Gona-Re-Zhou game reserve in 1934 led to the
displacement of 1 500 families and their subsequent
relocation in the overcrowded Matibi 2 reserve in Natural
region 5 (Tarutira 1988).
The period from after the Second World War to 1960 was
characterised by an intensification of the preservation
policies. The promulgation of the National Parks Act in
1949 led to the establishment of the Department of
National Parks in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. For the
first time a department responsible for the administration
and management of wildlife in the country came into
existence. However, from the outset the department was
beset with problems associated with the shortage of
funds, which severely curtailed their ability to effectively
implement the existing game laws (Masona 1987). This
original wildlife agency was fundamentally protective of
wildlife in outlook, in line with the preservationist
policies. It was also inward-looking and had a strong
enforcement (essentially policing) capacity. The department
was also directly responsible for the management of
wildlife outside PAs, and as such the policing function
tended to extend outside the PAs into the communal
areas. Staff recruited into the department were often
untrained former hunters expected to be jacks of all
trades.
During the inter-war years, more national parks were
proclaimed and by 1960 some 4 524 400ha of land had
been alienated for the parks and wildlife estate. This
includes six land use categories  national parks, botanical
reserves, botanical gardens, wildlife sanctuaries, safari
areas and recreational parks  designed for the protection
of higher plants and animals, and partially developed for
tourism. Landowners as well as peasant farmers
continued to be denied the opportunity to benefit from
the wildlife resources of their areas by the preservationist
policies and legislation which proscribed the
commercialisation of wild animals.
Therefore, for the period from the onslaught of
imperialism in the mid 19th century to 1960, successive
colonial regimes did not consider wildlife as a legitimate
form of land use. Initially, wild animals were seen as a
wasting asset, to be hunted for a lucrative trophy trade in
Europe (MacKenzie 1988). With the establishment of
more settled forms of colonialism and a settler economy
based on agriculture, wild animals came to be viewed as
competitors with cattle for grazing and also as
transmitters of a variety of diseases to cattle and were thus
to be eradicated to make way for the development of the
cattle industry. Both the colonial state and settlers
adopted a preservationist attitude towards wild animals
when the shooting out of game had depleted the game
resources of the country. The preservation of wild
animals was, however, designed for the benefit of only
the elite. These preservationist policies did not save wild
animals on private land and in the reserves. In the
reserves, wild animals were pushed out as population
pressure increased. On alienated land, wild animals were
shot out as landowners sought to increase their livestock
herds and to reduce competition and diseases from
wildlife.
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Woodland policies in Zimbabwe went through a similar
trajectory to wildlife management policies. Concerns over
woodland management were first voiced in the early
colonial period over timber extraction for mining
activities and for tobacco curing. During this period, given
the overriding mining objective of the colonisation
process, miners rights superseded all other legislative
controls, resulting in widespread removal of timber from
many parts of the country (Scoones & Matose 1992). The
expansion of the tobacco industry, and the attendant
need for fuel wood used in the curing of tobacco, had a
similar effect on woodland (Fortman & Nhira 1992).
Legislative controls on woodland were first established
with the passing of the Native Reserves Forest Produce
Act of 1928, later to be replaced by the Natural Resources
Act of 1942 and the Forest Act of 1948. These Acts were
intended to preserve woodland and reflected the
declining influence of the mining sector and the
corresponding need to establish a regulatory framework
for the emerging agricultural sector (Scoones & Matose
1992). Like wildlife legislation before it, the Native
Reserves Forest Act of 1928 contained dualistic
provisions for the African and European sectors of the
population. Voluntary regulation was encouraged for the
white farmers while a strict regulatory emphasis was
placed on the African population:
This inherited dualism in legislative provision for
resource management is still apparent in amended acts
today. In the communal areas, the emphasis remains on
regulatory control by the state with limited options for
active participation by local populations (Scoones &
Matose 1992:4).
However, Scoones and Matose (1992) contend that the
major influence on woodland management in the
communal areas emerged not from forestry legislation,
but from state land-use planning and administration
interventions. The centralisation policies of the 1920s led
to the establishment of planned settlements away from
the water sources in blocks on the wooded top land areas.
This resulted in the clearing of woodland areas in the top
lands for arable agriculture, with the previously settled
and often unwooded lowland areas allocated to grazing.
From game preservation to wildlife
utilisation
The Wildlife Conservation Act of 1960 marked a
significant shift from previous preservationist wildlife
legislation in that it allowed licensed owners and
occupiers of alienated land to commercially utilise wildlife
on their lands. It did not, however, apply to the reserves,
where wildlife remained state property with no local
proprietorship. While previous legislation had allowed
owners and occupiers of alienated land to utilise wildlife
on their land, it had proscribed the commercial utilisation
of wild animals.
In 1960 the Rhodesian government commissioned a
consultancy study to advise on the economic feasibility of
game ranching. The consultants initiated feasibility work
at Doddieburn ranch from which they set up cropping
quotas and obtained special permits for the marketing of
meat, hides and skins. The study concluded that wildlife
was probably a more efficient producer of meat than cattle
because of the ability of wild animals to utilise a greater
variety of flora than cattle (Child 1988). The experiment
was later extended to the Buffalo Range ranch in 1961. In
the mid-1960s the international safari industry experienced
a boom and the commercial activities of game ranches
shifted to safari hunting as the major form of wildlife
exploitation. The industry expanded steadily in the 1970s
and 1980s. By 1974, some 179 ranchers had acquired
permits to utilise wildlife on their ranches (Child
1988:775). Between 1975 and 1984, the safari-hunting
industry grew at an annual rate of about 6% (Child &
Child 1987)
The early experiences of game ranching and the increasing
number of farmers entering into the wildlife industry, as
well as the capacity of the safari industry to earn valuable
foreign exchange during a time of sanctions against the
Rhodesian regime, and the need to diversify agriculture,
led to the promulgation of the Parks and WildLife Act in
1975. A specific objective of the Act was to confer
privileges on the owners and occupiers of alienated land
as custodians of wildlife. The Act differed from the
Wildlife Conservation Act of 1960 in that it allowed the
owners and occupiers of alienated land to utilise wildlife
on their land without a permit, provided the privilege was
not abused (Child 1988).
The Parks and Wildlife Act of 1975 was designed to
improve the efficiency of wildlife utilisation by enhancing
local proprietorship. In terms of the Act, while wildlife
remained state property, the owners and occupiers of
alienated land became the proprietors of the wild animals
on their land and could thus legally utilise these animals.
Game ranching expanded even further with the
promulgation of this Act (Child 1988). By 1987, the safari
industry yielded estimated direct revenue of Z$10
million, most of it in foreign currency.
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The Wildlife Producers Association (WPA)  a
commodity association under the umbrella of the
Commercial Farmers Union (CFU)  was registered in
1986 and had a membership approaching 500 in 1987.
This membership is more significant when one considers
that the sizes of some of the members holdings are larger
than 100 000 hectares. Under the Parks and Wildlife Act of
1975, game ranching has expanded to include at least
three basic categories of operation. The first category is a
multi-species cattle and wildlife production operation,
undertaken mostly by the earliest game ranchers of the
south-eastern lowveld operating on properties which
already had significant wildlife populations when they
ventured into game ranching. In some of the cases,
however, there have been significant purchases of wild
animals from the Department of National Parks and
Wildlife Management (DNPWLM) by the ranchers. Wild
animals in this category of game ranching are used mainly
through trophy hunting and some venison cropping.
The second category of game ranching operations
involves the intensively cropped mixed farms of the
highveld. These farmers had to introduce wild animals
onto their properties because stocks had been depleted.
The properties tend to be smaller ranches and they
seldom have the dangerous wildlife species. Wildlife
marketing in this category is largely through game-
viewing safaris (walking or riding), and bow hunting has
now been introduced.
Because of the salience of the land issue in Zimbabwe
today, game ranching on the highveld has been the bone
of contention between the large-scale commercial farmers
engaging in the practice  the CFU and WPA on the one
hand, who argue that game ranching is a legitimate land
use which produces significantly larger returns per unit
area than other land uses  and the smallholders, the
Zimbabwe Farmers Union and the Ministry of
Agriculture on the other, who see the practice as being
designed to disguise the under-utilisation of land by the
large-scale farmers. It is further argued by the latter group
that in any case the benefits of game ranching accrue to the
individual landowner, while the cost to the macro-
economy in terms of reduced food security due to the
removal from production of land suitable for food
production is considerable.
The third category of game ranching in Zimbabwe
consists of specialised operations, usually focusing on
single species. The nature, size and location of the
operation are determined by the species farmed.
Examples of current operations in this category are
crocodile and ostrich farming. Eland and zebra have also
been considered for specialisation.
The most fundamental conclusions drawn from the
success of game ranching on alienated land in Zimbabwe
were that the devolution of proprietorship to landowners
resulted in them developing the economic potential of
the resource, which in turn led to sustainable utilisation
of wildlife. Previous game-management practices on
alienated land were designed to exterminate the resource
because wild animals produced no significant economic
benefits for the landowners but actually constituted a
significant cost (Child 1988; Child & Child 1987). Thus
changes in the attitudes of the landowners to wildlife
occurred because of two fundamental factors:
proprietorship of the resource and the ability to earn




This paper has demonstrated that land-use policies
generally, and particularly wildlife management policies of
the colonial regimes, tended to be accommodations of
the conflict between settler agriculture and wildlife.
Wildlife was almost eliminated from alienated land
because it did not have any commercial values until the
promulgation of the Wildlife Conservation Act of 1960,
and also because landowners had rights to utilise the
wildlife on their properties. In the communal areas, on
the other hand, the resident populations had no legal
access to the resource, although it constituted a cost to
their agriculture in the same ways as on alienated land. In
these areas, the decline of the wildlife resource is
attributed to the system of communal tenure, which
potentially leads to a tragedy of the commons, as well as
to the lack of legitimate benefits from wildlife.
Proprietorship and the rights to utilise wildlife were not
seen as the causes of the decline of wildlife populations in
this land-tenure category.
The post-colonial/neo-colonial governments of southern
Africa have continued with, sometimes even strengthened,
colonial conservation practices. In many case conservation
has increased in the post-colonial era, with many new PAs
being proclaimed on the same bases as colonial PAs, and
with little or no regard for the conservation and
livelihood practices of the local populations. In the post-
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colonial era/neo-colonial era, conservation continues to
be imposed  in an alien and arbitrary manner  barring
people from their lands and denying their understanding
of non-human nature (Adams 2003:9).
Although there has been a general ideological shift
towards a view of conservation as sustainable resource
use (for example, the IUCN and the World Wide Fund
for Nature (WWF), the dominant western ideology
regarding conservation has remained preservationist
(Adams 2003:9). The CBDs language of biodiversity has
come to drive a protectionist programme, including
reinforcing the PA strategy based largely upon a US model
of national parks and wilderness reserves, a tradition
which fosters a conceptual separation between humans
and nature, and between nature and culture (Adams
2003:9). This creates moral and practical dilemmas,
especially in poor countries, where human needs are
sometimes dependent on access to nature.
While colonial conservation policies were in part justified
on the basis of the need to achieve ecological equilibrium
through the exclusion of human impact, contemporary
science appears to discredit this notion. Non-equilibrium
ecology has demonstrated that dry-land ecosystems, in
particular, exist in different states of disequilibria. This
finding creates new opportunities for overcoming the
colonial model of nature conservation, especially by
allowing for resource extraction while recognising the
impacts that human use may impose on the ecosystem.
There are also significant moves to privatise conservation
and to grant the private sector greater access to existing
PAs. While most PAs in the region are state PAs, it is
significant that most states in southern Africa have very
limited financial, human and other material resources
necessary to manage the conservation estate. Yet the
model of conservation pursued has tended to exclude
other potential partners, with the result that most PAs in
the region are experiencing enormous management
problems. In some instances it has emerged that there is
greater biodiversity outside of PAs than inside. As a
consequence of its incapacity to manage the PAs, the state
in southern Africa is coming under increasing pressure to
privatise the management of these areas to private-sector
entities who have the resources for their management.
Given the current dominance of the neo-liberal market
agenda, it is quite clear that some important PAs in the
region will be privatised in the coming years. It is not clear
what the private sectors agenda is in these initiatives, and
care needs to be taken to ensure that conservation does
not become subordinated to short-term profit motives
as conservation inexorably gets privatised.
1. Donald Moores (1992) study of the Nyanga National
Park demonstrates conflicts over the parks land with
surrounding communal lands.
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Introduction
What are the origins of CBNRM in
southern Africa?
While recognising that CBNRM evolved as a regional
effort, and often through regional networks of key
individuals, the story of its evolution will be built around
the experience of Zimbabwe, which provided much of
the early impetus to this movement.
Zimbabwe always prided itself on conservation policies
that were rooted strongly in the hands of landholders. As
early as 1939, the Parliamentary Commission under Justice
Robert McIlwaine introduced landholder community
control over natural resources on private land (Natural
Resources Act of 1941). The bottom-up wildlife approach
was grafted onto the far-sighted Intensive Conservation
Areas (ICA) movement. Reacting to public concern over
soil erosion and other environmental degradation, the
McIlwaine Commission of 1939 led to the promulgation
of the Natural Resources Act of 1941, the backbone of
Zimbabwes remarkably successful conservation efforts.
The success of the ICA movement lay in its strong legal
mandate and accountability to a membership of local
landholders. Each ICA committee (some 400 blanketed
the country) was comprised of elected local landholders,
and the only support provided by government was a small
secretariat fee, travelling expenses and the presence of
technical officers when required.
Wildlife policies were less far-sighted, and remained
highly centralised, non-commercial and inappropriate
until Reay Smithers began to agitate for landholder use
rights in the 1950s. On his invitation, three outstanding
American Fulbright Scholars from the University of
California (Thane Riney, Ray Dasmann, Archie Mossman),
were invited to Zimbabwe, where they stimulated a
philosophy that encompassed scientific management and
the sustainable use of wildlife. They argued that the
widespread neglect and slaughter of wildlife on private
land was because it was of no legal value to landholders
and was competing with legitimate farming enterprises
 the you cant farm in a zoo adage. In practical terms,
they initiated experimentation with game ranching on
several lowveld ranches; most notably game cropping on
Doddieburn and Buffalo Range owned by the
Hendersons and Styles respectively, who were both
passionate about wildlife. They also pulled together
lessons from the use of wildlife on private land in the
Transvaal province of South Africa. Riney was requested
to do an Africa-wide survey of wildlife for the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO),
and although it is over 40 years old, this remarkable
document echoes much of what we hear in southern
Africa today.
Origins and efficacy of modern
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The Wildlife Conservation Act of 1960 opened the door
to the sustainable use of wildlife. Use of wildlife was
encouraged, albeit through a permit system. Key officials
saw little value-added in excess regulation and worked on
eliminating bureaucracy. This aversion to value-negative
red tape was reflected in the Parks and Wildlife Act of
1975. The Act provided private landholders with
appropriate authority (that is, extensive use rights) for
wildlife on their land. An important feature was the
empowerment of local landholder communities to
control abuses (through the ICA/Natural  Resources
Board [NRB] mechanism), with the outcome that the
externalities associated with fugitive wildlife resources
were managed highly successfully at a local level.1
Requirements for government use permits were
abolished, although several communities initiated quota
systems for key species. Government did retain the power
to intervene where the devolved system proved
ineffective, and in two decades only had to act twice, in
both cases to control hunting on properties immediately
adjacent to parks.
During the early 1970s ideas were spreading across the
region through regular contact between southern Africas
leading conservationists at the Southern African Regional
Commission for the Conservation and Utilisation of the
Soil (SARCCUS) meetings (Graham Child,  pers. comm.)
In 1971, for example, they met at Gorongoza to discuss
the theme Nature conservation as a form of land use. At
this time, the innovative Bernabie de la Bat was heading
the Namibian wildlife agency. These conservationists
provided the fulcrum of the then (and now) progressive
idea that wildlife was potentially a major and profitable
form of land use in non-agricultural ecosystems. It was
no coincidence that in 1975 Namibia also introduced
legislation which empowered private landholders to use
wildlife commercially, although in this case only certain
species could be used. Gradually, similar practices spread
though South Africas decentralised provincial system.
In the 1980s the vehicle of connectivity, learning and
mutual support was the CBNRM, and the battle to keep
markets for wildlife products open was exemplified by
the Southern African Centre for Ivory Marketing
(SACIM) and the fight against the ivory ban. These
networks were particularly effective because the
commitment and professional capacity of these officials
was combined with a significant degree of authority 
they wrote legislation, and their technical recommendations
were listened to and respected by politicians.
Game ranching began to expand rapidly in the early- to
mid-1980s. Local use rights enabled change to occur. A
rapid improvement in the relative profitability of wildlife
drove this change. This resulted partly from increasing
demand for wildlife-based recreation and partly from
declining livestock profitability. In about 1973, the world
beef price declined from $4 to $2.5 (in constant [1980]
US$) and never recovered, a trend that also had a major
impact on ranching in the USA. However, the declining
world beef price occurred at the same time as a reduction in
the political power of white farmers to attract subsidies to
the livestock sector, and rising demand and prices for
outdoor recreation, hunting and other wildlife products.
This radically changed the economics of the rangeland
sector.
The fact that wildlife was emerging as a competitive land
use was of fundamental importance to wildlife policy for
communal areas. It provided real confidence in the
argument that wildlife was a competitive land use in
marginal areas, and a practical model to work from. Thus
the innovation in communal areas was the institutional
and governance arrangements, rather than the technicalities
of wildlife-enterprise production systems. Contrary to
the widely-held view, community wildlife management
was actually initiated almost a decade before independence
by a small group of far-sighted conservationists.
As early as 1971, Zimbabwes wildlife department began
to advocate sustainable use principles for wildlife in
communal lands. In the early 1970s, the initial drafts of
the Parks and Wildlife Act provided for communal area
communities to become appropriate authorities. This
was blocked, first by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and,
on two subsequent occasions, by changes in governments.
The Act was eventually amended in this manner in 1982,
but at this time communities were not (and are still not)
legal entities, so authority was devolved (unhappily) to
district councils.
Nevertheless, in the mid-1970s the department persuaded
the Minister, with much patience and perseverance, to
commit revenues from three game reserves (Chirisa,
Dande, Malipati) to the people living around them. This
represented a major change in government fiscal policy
when it was ushered quietly through the House. The
cumbersome and ultimately unsound administration of
this money through the Consolidated Revenue Fund for
development projects was recognised at the time.
However, the relatively weak Wildlife Department
believed that the government of the day, and especially
the powerful Ministry of Internal Affairs, would never
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have accepted direct fiscal empowerment of local people.
Getting agreement that the money would be returned to
rural people, albeit through a cumbersome and
unsatisfactory arrangement, was at least a first step in the
right direction.
Operation Windfall (Wildlife Industries New
Development for All) was the departments first major
success in channelling wildlife revenues back to local
communities. In 1980 and 1981, 755 elephant were culled
(earning US$463 000), to which was added $160 920 from
safari hunting in Chirisa Safari Area. These substantial
revenues were paid back to communities through councils
for approved projects. Central to this model was the
empowerment of community members at village level to
control wildlife and its revenues, the internalisation of
costs and benefits at this level, 2 and an underlying belief
that wildlife was the most sustainable land-use option in
many of these remote communal areas. In many ways it
reflected the principles of landholder control that had
proved so successful through the ICA movement on
private land. Initial implementation in Gokwe and
Nyaminyami was unsatisfactory. Payments went through
the government fiscal cycle, Treasury often delayed
payments further, and money was allocated only for
approved development projects.
The first example of a community wildlife programme
was probably in Mahenye (see Box 3 on page 15) where, in
1982, two elephants were hunted by Clive Stockil and,
with the encouragement and permission of the Director of
the Wildlife Department, the money was eventually
returned to the community for the construction of a
school. Much more, however, is known about
Nyaminyami because a larger group of people, in what
was then a highly unusual mix  wildlife managers and
social workers  went to some lengths to prepare it to
assume authority to manage its wildlife. This included
ecological work as well as the formation of the
Nyaminyami Wildlife Trust. In 1989, the Department
granted Nyaminyami District Council appropriate
authority status, thus short-circuiting Treasury for the first
time. This meant wildlife revenues would be paid directly
to the council. Mistakes were made in Nyaminyami,
including excessive levels of unsustainable financial
support, and despite being the first district to receive such
status, it never really followed the Campfire principles.




One of the critical outcomes of Campfire was the set of
principles by which the programme was managed. In the
Box 1: Communal Areas Management Programme for
Indigenous Resources (Campfire)
A brief history:
1960s Game ranching initiated on private land.
1971 Communal area benefits first proposed by Director, Department of National Parks and Wildlife
Management.
Late 1970s Department persuades Ministry of Local Government and Treasury to change fiscal policy, thus
allowing revenue earned in protected areas recently excised from tribal trust lands to be returned
(Chirisa, Dande, Malipati).
Late 1970s Ecologists working in Sebungwe note rapidly rising populations and propose the economic use of
wildlife to (1) soften hard edges of parks and maintain corridors between them and (2) promote
rural economic growth.
Early 1980s Martin and others compile Sebungwe Land Use Plan. Not implemented due to bureaucratic
challenges, but promotes conceptual development.
1980 Under Project Windfall  revenues from elephant culling in Sengwa Wildlife Research Area and safari
hunting in Chirisa returned to Gokwe District Council.
1984 Rowan Martin develops Campfire documents. This sets the philosophical basis of Campfire.
1989 Appropriate authority status granted to Nyaminyami and Guruve District Council, and ten others
in 1990.
36
local communities, equity and conservation in southern africa
initial stages of Campfire, and despite the legislative
weaknesses that later allowed slippage, a strong and
gentlemanly commitment to these principles ensured
that the amount of revenues used at community level
increased steadily. It was the justice, economic and
institutional sophistication embedded in these principles,
and the great hope and vigour that it gave communities,
that propelled Campfire into the international limelight.
It was also propelled by the powerful devolutionary
impulse associated with these principles, and the
remarkable consequences of entrusting communities
with responsibility.
Several sets of overlapping theories come together in
southern Africas CBNRM philosophy. The first is
concerned with empowerment, the second with
organisational development and democratisation, and
the  third with market and pricing theory. Progress, where
it has been made, has also been underpinned by sensible
and liberalised economic policies, and a sound sense of
ecological function. Where the macro-political environment
has reneged on these principles, as in Zimbabwe,
progress has reversed.
The southern African experience suggests that
empowerment consists of three primary components 
that communities have the rights:
! to retain the full benefits of their wildlife
! to sell their wildlife to best advantage
! to manage their wildlife, including the selling of
quotas or tourism joint ventures, and the design of
concession areas.
In addition to formal rights, communities need to be
aware and convinced of these rights, and to have the
capacity to take advantage of them. This is where capacity
building comes in. Capacity building is a necessary
complement to enable communities to take advantage of
these rights, and is invaluable for strengthening them.
However, in some cases implementing agencies have
been unable to acquire rights for communities, and have
spent a great deal of money on the assumption that
capacity building will eventually bring about devolution.
In the 1960s and 1970s, several southern African
countries recognised that wildlife would only survive if it
was financially viable for landholders to conserve it. The
first signs of these principles being applied to communal
lands were in Zimbabwe, and soon after, in Zambias
Luangwa Valley, following the Lupande workshop in
1983 that gave rise to both the Administrative Design for
Management (ADMADE) and the Luangwa Integrated
Resource Development Project (LIRDP).
To return to the three components of empowerment: the
necessity of returning revenues to landholders and
communities was long accepted, both as an essential
feature of sustainability and as a moral imperative.
Nevertheless, there was considerable debate at the time
over the question of whether wildlife should be a public
resource at community level (and used primarily to fund
public works as decided by leaders), or should be
converted into a private resource at the level of the
individual. The wildlife authorities recognised that the
former might benefit the level of public services in the
short-run, but was fundamentally unsustainable.
Therefore they experimented with partial revenue
distribution at household level with each family in
Masoka being paid $200 in 1990.
The real, and second, breakthrough came in the
Chikwarakwara community in Beitbridge in 1990. With
growing land pressures, the wildlife authorities knew that
unless wildlife was a valuable commodity at household
level it would be replaced by other private forms of land
use  livestock, or scratching agriculture. They were also
concerned that unless every rural person had a real,
tangible stake in wildlife, knew the value of wildlife and
could fight for their rights to benefit, the hierarchy would
appropriate these revenues. In a tale with enough twists
to grace a spy novel, an alliance between the Wildlife
Department and the local community out-manoeuvred
the bureaucracy and, for the first time, ensured that each
and every community member was involved in choosing
how to use wildlife revenues, including the retention of a
cash dividend at household level. The latter proved so
powerful that it soon became a central principle of the
Campfire programme.
Believing strongly in the maturity and capacity of rural
people once the shackles of dependency and permission
were removed, the Wildlife Department also insisted that
communities sold wildlife themselves. The only
insistence was that the marketing process was open,
transparent and highly competitive.
The third major breakthrough in terms of empowerment
was the devolution of setting of quotas to community
level. Again, this was supported by the development of
simple but robust tools for monitoring and analysis.
Essentially, communities meet for several days in a
facilitated forum to triangulate data on trophy quality and
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wildlife populations from several sources. The output is a
quota that is submitted to the Wildlife Department for
approval. The system worked so well, and certainly
produced better results than even a technical competent
department, that the response of technicians was why
ever didnt we do this before? Not only did good quotas
result, but the participation and learning of communities
about managing wildlife was powerful. Further, as
communities knew their quotas, they were able to
calculate expected revenues, providing a further lever
towards transparency and accountability.
How do these
characteristics and
origins vary in the region?
So far the discussion has centred on Zimbabwe. The
situation in Namibia is remarkably congruent. As in
Zimbabwe, a small number of highly motivated
professional bureaucrats formed alliances with civil society,
taking the role of policy reformation while encouraging
the outsourcing of capacity building to NGOs and CBOs.
As with Zimbabwe, the majority of bureaucrats proved
to be reactive, so the survival of the programme probably
depends on empowering communities sufficiently
quickly so that they can use tangible results to argue
against re-centralisation. In Botswana, however, the
catalyst for change appears to have been the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID)-funded
Natural Resource Management Project, with sufficient co-
operation from government to implement sufficiently
sound policy change.
Namibia
It was at about this time that the baton of CBNRM was
passed to the Namibians. Recognising the institutional
roadblocks that prevented the Zimbabweans from
properly applying their own Campfire principles, the new
Conservancy legislation promulgated in 1997 allowed
for self-identification and formation of bodies corporate
at any level. In 1997, Namibia enacted new legislation,
which allowed the devolved management of wildlife by
communities provided they were registered as
conservancies. Together with a strong set of emerging
support organisations, this legal change led to major
positive trends in wildlife conservation:
! The number of people involved in conservancies
increased rapidly to 32 086, with some 70 000
additional people in conservancies awaiting registration.
! By 2001, 15 registered conservancies already managed
over 200 000 wild animals in 40 000km2. This is
expected to rise to 49 conservancies and 100 000 km2.
! With effective technical support, wildlife/tourism
income to communities doubled in each of the last
five years, and was expected to reach N$12m in 2002,
with a potential for substantial further growth.
! In north-west Namibia, communities currently get
2% of the $98m wildlife/tourism business. This is
expected to rise to 10% of a $375m sector.
! The programme developed 14 well co-ordinated
support agencies with jointly agreed work
programmes.
Botswana
At about the same time (19932001), Botswana
developed a large amount of CBNRM-related legislation,
policy and guidelines. The rights and responsibilities of
communities over natural resources in Botswana are
mainly defined in the 15-year community natural
resources management lease between the legally registered
community trust and the land authority. This gives the
community trust exclusive use (not ownership) of their
area (including controlled hunting areas) for all tourism-
related activities, hunting, game capture, and commercial
use of veld products. However, the Wildlife Department
retains the right to set quotas, and the collaboration with
communities is less than desired.
The number of communities involved in CBNRM has
grown rapidly. Two factors have contributed to this:
! formal use rights
! the increasing value of wildlife and NRM.
One of Botswanas real strengths has been the
development of joint venture arrangements between
CBOs and the private sector. This has had a positive
impact on natural resource management, and has
brought significant revenues to local communities. In
general, 15% of these revenues are used to manage the
CBO, and the community uses the remainder for
development projects, although one of the constraints
has been the ability of the community to spend this
money. The involvement of the private sector, alongside
Botswanas liberalised economic policies, has enabled
rapid growth in community income. As in Zimbabwe
and Namibia, the key to economic growth has been well-
developed community-private joint venture arrangements.
What then is CBNRM?
Perhaps a useful definition of CBNRM is that it deals with
the transfer of ownership of high-value, common-property
resources from the state to communities. It may also deal
with the externalities at the interface of private resources or
Origins and efficacy of modern CBNRM practices
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enterprises occurring on common property, such as charcoal
harvesting or cattle production in a villages range, as
illustrated in the diagram above.
Note that the top definition of CBNRM introduces:
! efficiency (it deals with high value resources)
! equity (it often transfers value to the poorest rural
communities)
! improved resource management and sustainability
(by privatising ownership at the community level,
that is, transforming open access to private/common
property regimes).
CBNRM works if it tackles fundamental issues of profit and
proprietorship.
Devolution is an extremely powerful force for creating the
sought-after combination of conservation and economic
growth, and for directing this value towards reducing
poverty and empowering local communities  as is seen
in the examples of Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia.
However, the transaction costs of shifting the control of
high-value resources from the centre (government
agencies) to communities can be high. These costs
include:
! negotiating devolved use rights (high level of costs
and conflict if no political will)
! developing management capacity at local level




The successful Botswana, Namibian and Zimbabwean
CBNRM programmes have some common characteristics.
The programmes were run under government mandate.
However, government did not attempt to dominate the
sector and was usually responsible for policy, guidelines,
monitoring (but staffing often limited to 12 persons).
Instead, and according to their comparative advantages,
NGOs/CBOs were mandated with the bulk of capacity
building. In all cases the support agencies had close
informal working relationships, but also met formally to
agree strategy and even joint work plans. Specifically, the
Namibian programme is co-ordinated by an NGO
association (NACSO), and co-ordination is highly
formalised   there is not yet producer-community
representation on this forum. In Zimbabwe, National
Parks passed the lead role to a producer association
(Campfire Association) and capacity building to several
NGOs, and these partners met regularly through the
Campfire Collaborative Group, having clearly defined
roles and responsibilities. In Botswana, a CBO
(BOCOBONET) co-ordinates the programme, with
government and NGO support.
Conclusions and the way
forward
The paper attempted to address the following questions:
What were the key motivations and driving forces behind
CBNRM? How were conservation departments positioned
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driver role of conservation departments in CBNRM, how
can they be supported to remain effective? How else can
effective support be provided to strengthen CBNRM?
As we have seen, it was no accident that southern Africas
wildlife departments initiated a major paradigm shift.
This was not a sudden good idea that emerged in 1990,
but was the result of at least 30 (and up to 50) years of
gradual policy changes, coupled with implementation
capacity through the building of a high level of
professionalism, commitment and excellence in the
sector, and in government agencies in particular.
This paper has demonstrated the critical role played by
government departments in initiating (or retarding) the
growth of CBNRM programmes. However, for a
number of reasons, the quality of these departments is
dropping; they no longer provide critical leadership and
insight and, in some cases are downright reactive.
Supporting weak government departments, particularly
with respect to policy formulation, does not have a good
track record. Perhaps the best way to proceed is a radical
one  set up sound performance criteria, and pay for
projects that work.
In this last point, perhaps, lies a potential solution that is
not focused on a few high-level champions, but of
capturing the combined capacity of many communities:
in short, to move from a bureaucratically-led to a market-
led solution. A suggestion is to create a peer-based
governing value system that includes a regular review of
performance criteria so that communities and countries
learn from, and pressure, each other. The skill is to create
simple performance criteria that incorporate CBNRMs
founding principles of devolution, democracy, ecological
sustainability, and business-like management of natural
resources. Now that the concept is widely accepted, there
is considerable potential to achieve greater progress with
less money by improving management systems.
One means of achieving this would be to facilitate
regional CBNRM programmes to meet regularly to
review their performance. Thus each programme would
be self-assessed, and a regular report on its status and
trends with respect to mutually agreed criteria made
available. This report, playing a  similar role to a company
report, would then provide the key to investment
decisions, and, by invoking such a system, pressure to
comply with sound principles and performance indicators
would be provided by information and the market place
rather than by overseers in NGOs or government
agencies. Thus consumers (hunters and tourists) could
select where to spend their money according to what then
happens to this money. If provided with reliable
information they would likely opt to visit programmes
that benefit local people rather than those that do not.
Investors, too, are likely to target sounder programmes.
With some education donor funding could also be
targeted in this direction. Finally, by setting out clear
targets and visions, and by peer-reviewing these on a
regular basis, powerful psychological forces may well
come into play.
The evidence presented here suggests that, where
CBNRM principles are followed in southern Africa,
progress is steady if not rapid. So far control systems have
rested in the hands of bureaucrats and project executants.
Perhaps it is now time to radically alter the system, and to
provide performance discipline through the medium of
validated information and the market place.
1. This institutional fencing was amazingly effective, with
low transaction costs and high levels of local
commitment. It is somewhat surprising that the concept
has not spread to South Africa and Namibia, where
externalities tend to be controlled by steel fencing.  Not
only is steel fencing financially expensive, but it is also
ecologically hazardous, preventing wildlife movement
and allowing landholders to mask mismanagement such
as over-stocking.
2. The economic sophistication of this model, and its
understanding of property rights, was influenced by
emerging literature such as Hardins Tragedy of the commons
and Stroup and Badens work. Another strong influence
was Norman Reynolds, then Chief Economist in the
Ministry of Economic Planning, who added to this mix a
strong understanding of the development process born of
his experience in rural India.
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Introduction
In recent decades the southern African region has seen the
emergence of an array of wildlife management systems
including:
! management by individual freehold farmers
! corporate conservancies on pooled freehold land
! community management regimes on communal
land.
This paper considers these management regimes in terms
of a number of key elements that are a crucial part of the
philosophy and practice of CBNRM in the region. These
elements are:
! economic incentives and conditions
! devolution of rights and tenure over land and
resources
! collective proprietorship
! scale (social and ecological)
! community empowerment (the extent to which local
communities themselves are able to take decisions
about CBNRM activities).
The paper then identifies some key lessons with regard to
CBNRM and relationships between local communities
and protected areas.
CBNRM philosophy
CBNRM in southern Africa is concerned with providing
communal area landholders with the appropriate
incentives to manage land and renewable natural
resources sustainably. It rests on a perception that it is not
the overuse of specific resources or species that is the
greatest threat, but that the greatest threat in terrestrial
situations lies in natural systems being replaced with
other land uses (SASUSG 1996). A number of
statements and principles have been developed concerning
CBNRM in southern Africa (see for example,  Murphree
1993; Steiner & Rihoy 1995; Bond 2001). These can be
distilled into the central hypothesis that if a resource is
valuable and landholders have the rights to use, benefit
from and manage the resource, then sustainable use is
likely. The benefits from management must exceed the
perceived costs and must be secure over time.
There are three main conceptual foundations to the
hypothesis. The first is based on the notion of economic
instrumentalism. The assumption is that the most critical
decisions regarding the allocation of land, resources and
management investments are based primarily on
economics rather than conservation considerations
(Jones & Murphree 2001). It is therefore necessary to give
a resource such as wildlife a focused value that can be
realised by the landholder. At the same time the
landholder will be unlikely to invest time, effort and
finances into managing a resource if the benefits do not
exceed the costs. Policy therefore needs to ensure that
wildlife has a value that can be realised by landholders and
that other forms of land use are not unfairly subsidised or
wildlife use unfairly taxed.
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The second conceptual foundation is the notion of
devolutionism. In all southern African states, authority
over wildlife has been centralised by the state. This
occurred during the colonial era and most post-colonial
governments maintained such centralised authority. In
order to create positive conditions for landholders to
manage wildlife sustainably, the ability to take crucial
management decisions needed to be devolved1 from the
state to the landholders. In most cases in southern Africa,
a situation had arisen where government retained the
authority while landholders (freehold and communal)
bore the responsibility over wildlife management  (as well
as having to bear the costs of damage caused by
herbivores to crops and by predators to livestock).
The third conceptual foundation of CBNRM is that of
collective proprietorship. If authority over wildlife was to
be devolved to people on communal lands, then who
should receive these rights, and could effective
institutions develop for collective management of
wildlife? Who should be recognised as the proprietors
of the wildlife? Many commentators (such as Murphree &
Hulme 2001; Cousins 2000; SASUSG 1996; IFAD 1995)
have emphasised the importance of tenure and property
rights or proprietorship for sustainable natural resource
management. Murphree (1994) defines proprietorship as:
! sanctioned use rights, including the right to
determine the mode and extent of
! management and use, rights of access and inclusion,
and the right to benefit fully from use and
management.
The term tenure includes a temporal dimension and
relates to the period of proprietorship. Secure tenure is
important for resource users to be confident that they can
invest time and effort in management and reap the
benefits. CBNRM has therefore been based largely on the
concept of a communal property regime, that is, where a
defined group of people collectively manages and uses the
common property resources within a defined jurisdiction
(Jones & Murphree 2001).
The concept of collective proprietorship gives rise to a
number of challenges in terms of implementation, not
least of which is dealing with the issue of scale. Scale is
important at the community level because collective
decision making is easier between smaller, relatively
cohesive social units where there is direct interaction
between decision makers and peer pressure can also play a
part in ensuring conformity to resource use rules. Scale is
also important in terms of resource management,
particularly with a fugitive resource such as wildlife,
where some species range over large areas of land. It can
therefore be difficult sometimes to match appropriate
size social units with appropriate size wildlife management
units. Scale is also important in terms of the level at which
decision making is located. The more a resource is shared
across larger areas of land, the more important it becomes
for decision making to be shared across larger numbers of
resource users. However, the bigger the geographic scale,
the bigger the trade-off between highly interactive and
participatory decision making and representative forms of
decision making that begin to blur the lines of
accountability. Murphree (2000) suggests that the
problems associated with scale can be approached
through the use of three linked approaches:
1. The starting point should be small local jurisdictions
which combine authority with responsibility.
2. Where necessary these jurisdictions should aggregate
upwards through delegating authority to larger
jurisdictions in order to manage resources across
larger spatial scales.
3. In all cases the principle of downward accountability
should be applied.
Another challenge for promoting collective proprietorship
is to enable participants in collective management regimes
to define the membership themselves, and to define
the boundaries of their jurisdiction. This is important
for the development of a common property-resource
management institution that has internal legitimacy.
Typically, CBNRM programmes in southern Africa are
based on trying to operationalise the three conceptual
foundations outlined above, while trying to reconcile
some of the issues of scale. Throughout the region
governments have enabled local communities to gain
directly, or share in, the income from various forms of
wildlife use including trophy hunting and photographic
tourism. Governments have made some attempt to
devolve authority to lower, mostly non-state levels of
decision making; rights have been given to units of
collective proprietorship, which in some cases are self-
defining, while in others these are based on existing
state administrative units. In some cases the units of
proprietorship involve small, cohesive groups of people
with a sense of community, while in other cases the
units include large numbers of people. In most cases the
units of proprietorship do not necessarily conform to
what wildlife managers might deem to be units of
resource management.
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Wildlife management on
freehold land
To a large extent the development of the CBNRM
philosophy has built on the experiences of wildlife
management systems that emerged on freehold land in
Zimbabwe and Namibia. The wildlife management
systems established on freehold land in these two
countries represent examples where the state has
devolved proprietorship over wildlife to landholders.2 In
both countries, during the colonial period government
appropriated formal control over all wildlife and passed
legislation providing hunting rights to white settlers and
visiting sport hunters. On the white-owned freehold
farms the wildlife belonged to the state and commercial
farmers tended to see wildlife as competing with their
livestock and crop farming. On both communal and
freehold land, illegal use and conversion of wild habitat to
farmland led to declines in wildlife numbers.
In the 1960s there was a radical shift in wildlife policy away
from a protectionist philosophy to one of conservation
through sustainable use in Namibia and Zimbabwe
(Jones & Murphree 2001). The shift was away from state
control to individual proprietorship by white freehold
farmers, who could now benefit financially from the
wildlife on their farms. The approach of the state was very
clearly based on economic instrumentalism and the
devolution of property rights as key incentives and
conditions for sustainable management. Proprietorship
and benefit were seen as key incentives for sustainable
management.
Rights over wildlife were conferred on white freehold
farmers in Namibia in 1968 and consolidated in the
Nature Conservation Ordinance No 4 of 1975. The
Legislation gave conditional ownership over certain of
the more common species of game and limited use rights
over other species through a permit system. Ownership
and use rights were conditional upon a farmer owning
land of a certain size, which had to be enclosed by a certain
type of fencing. Freehold farmers were now able to hunt
game for their own use, buy and sell game, cull for the sale
of meat and entertain foreign trophy hunters on their
farms.
The Parks and Wildlife Act of 1975 formalised the policy
shift in Zimbabwe by aiming  to confer privileges on
owners or occupiers of alienated land as custodians of
wildlife, fish and plants (Government of Zimbabwe,
1994 as amended). The Act designates these owners or
occupiers of alienated land as appropriate authorities
over wildlife. Although the Act does not go so far in its
wording as the Namibian Legislation in conferring
ownership of certain species, it still effectively makes
farms and ranches into proprietorial units for wildlife
management. Farmers are able to take nearly all of the
significant management decisions over the use of wildlife.
The Act allows for the exemption of specially protected
species and for government to impose restriction orders
in cases of flagrant abuse. Martin (2003) suggests the
Zimbabwean legislation is the only example in southern
Africa of the full devolution of authority over wildlife to
entities outside the state.
In both Zimbabwe and Namibia, the effects of giving
white freehold farmers rights over wildlife were the
development of multi-million-dollar wildlife industries,
and an increase in wildlife on private freehold land. The
amount of wildlife in Zimbabwe quadrupled in response
to these policies and species richness nearly doubled
(Child et al. 2002). In Namibia, the number of game
species on freehold land increased by 44% over 20 years
while the total number of animals and biomass increased
by 80% between 1972 and 1992 (Ashley & Barnes 1996).
In both countries white freehold farmers responded
positively to the economic incentives provided by
government and the devolution of authority and
proprietorship from the state. To a large extent the
wildlife management systems that have emerged on
freehold land are relatively easy to implement  perhaps
crucially, freehold farmers were gaining resource rights
over wildlife in a situation where they had strong and
secure tenure (freehold) over their land and other
resources. This gave them stronger rights of enforcement
(for example, in terms of laws of trespass) and
management decisions could be taken quickly and easily
by the individual landowner. Freehold tenure also
provided farmers with the ability to use their land as
collateral for raising capital to invest in the infrastructure
necessary for the development of game ranches and
tourism. Another important consideration is that the
financial returns to the freehold farmer do not have to be
divided among many and therefore can have a significant
impact on each farmers income. Further, the government
subsidies that had gone into providing white farmers
with transport and telecommunications infrastructure in
the freehold farming areas enabled game farmers to have
easy contact with hunting and tourism markets and
enabled their clients to reach their farms.
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In an important development on freehold land, farmers
began to realise that there were significant advantages in
pooling their resources for wildlife management. In
Namibia many individual farm units (average size of
about 5 000 ha) were not large enough in semi- and arid
environmental conditions for successful game farming
(de Jager 1996). Successful game and livestock ranching in
arid, unpredictable environments requires large areas of
land on which animals can take opportunistic advantage
of pasture growth and water supply. Mobility and
flexibility are the key to survival. In the late 1980s a
number of individual freehold farmers began to discuss
the possibility of pooling their land, human, financial and
wildlife resources to manage their land in a more collective
manner for wildlife. After long and arduous negotiations
facilitated by conservation personnel, a group of farmers
agreed to adopt a model of resource management based
on the conservancy approach developed some years
earlier in Natal in South Africa (Jones 1999). They agreed
on a constitution and a set of operating rules and criteria
for the distribution of income derived from joint wildlife
management. Although the government had not then
legislated to give formal recognition to freehold area
conservancies, the then Directorate of Nature Conservation
and Recreational Resorts developed a policy
acknowledging such conservancies and establishing levels
of support (MWCT 1992).
There are now at least 24 conservancies on freehold land
in Namibia (double the 1998 number) covering an area of
close to 4 million ha. The size of the conservancies ranges
from 65 000 ha to 387 000 ha  even the smallest freehold
conservancy is larger than some state-run PAs in
Namibia. Efficiencies of scale have meant that financial
rates of return are more than twice those of individual
ranches with wildlife as a land use (Barnes & de Jager 1995).
In Zimbabwe, freehold conservancies began to emerge
following efforts by the DNPWLM to develop a
translocated breeding nucleus of black rhino in safe
sanctuaries. This objective led to freehold farmers
negotiating common property arrangements with their
neighbours to establish rhino conservancies. Given land-
use economics, persistent droughts and emerging
wildlife-based production systems, some conservancies
quickly developed towards becoming substantial business
enterprises (Murphree & Metcalfe 1997). The Save
Conservancy is an example of a rhino conservancy on land
used for livestock that developed into a business
operation based solely on wildlife and tourism. It
comprises 20 individual properties covering an area of 321
355 ha, with members ranging from small, family-owned
businesses to large companies (Save, Bubiana and
Chiredzi River Conservancies 1994).3
The development of conservancies in Zimbabwe has
been motivated by the need for:
! greater economic and ecological resilience in the face of
drought
! more efficient and sustainable use of key resources by
virtue of the greater diversity, biomass and mobility
of wildlife populations in the larger, unfenced area
! spreading risks
! resource management at a more appropriate scale
(Murphree & Metcalfe 1997:4).
Further, single landholders on relatively small properties
were often unable to afford the staffing levels, law
enforcement, fire-fighting, road maintenance and other
infrastructural requirements of a big game wildlife
enterprise. Conservancies offered the opportunity to
introduce economies of scale, making joint wildlife
enterprises possible (Wildlife Working Group 1996).
In South Africa freehold conservancies were promoted by
the Natal Parks Board to facilitate water catchment
conservation through encouraging groups of farmers to
monitor the impact of their land-management practices
on the health of river systems. The approach has been
extended to wildlife management where neighbouring
farmers have established joint arrangements for
maintaining sufficient wildlife for aesthetic and recreational
purposes rather than for production for consumptive use
(Murphree & Metcalfe 1997). Conservancies have also
been established in Free State province where the
provincial conservation authority has subsidised the
provision of wildlife to farmers in order to facilitate
species-conservation objectives. The large freehold private
game reserves next to Kruger National Park are also
sometimes referred to as conservancies because of the
level of co-operation between neighbouring landholders
in terms of traversing rights across unfenced land.
Essentially the formation of conservancies in all three
countries has aimed at coping with issues of scale related
to wildlife management and/or ecosystem conservation,
improving economic efficiency and providing
diversification of land uses (although at least one
Lessons learnt from the philosophy and practice of CBNRM in Southern Africa
44
local communities, equity and conservation in southern africa
conservancy in Zimbabwe has converted entirely to
wildlife).
It is interesting to note, however, that in South Africa and
Namibia intrinsic values have also been important
motivations (Ashley & Barnes 1996; Murphree &
Metcalfe 1997). These objectives have led individual
farmers with strong and secure proprietorship over their
land and resources to develop small-scale (in terms of
social units) common property regimes for managing
wildlife. This has involved developing mechanisms for
collective decision making, the equitable distribution of
benefits, the equitable sharing of costs and management
investments, and joint negotiation and interaction with
the state and other institutions. Given the elements of
common property resource management present in
freehold conservancies and the extent to which a
community of resource users and landholders is
involved, it could be argued that such arrangements
should also be categorised as constituting CBNRM.
Wildlife management on
communal land
The application of CBNRM approaches  on communal
land in southern Africa has had mixed results. In some
areas, wildlife numbers are being maintained or are
increasing and local communities are setting aside land for
wildlife and tourism. Local communities and individual
households are gaining some income from wildlife use.
However, the development of new wildlife management
systems and the implementation of CBNRM on
communal land have not been as straightforward as the
situation on freehold land. There are a number of factors
that contribute to the complexity of the situation in
communal areas. These include:
! the larger numbers of people that are involved in
collective proprietorship institutions
! internal differentiation within communities
! the need to create new wildlife management
institutions
! the need for communities to gain knowledge and
understanding of some technical aspects of wildlife
management and the operation of the tourism industry
! the need for governments to shift towards provision
of extension and advice to community wildlife
managers
! the need for communities to gain access to capital and
markets.
These and other factors have led to a number of
problems in implementing CBNRM in communal areas.
Challenges for economic
incentive-based approaches
It is difficult for economic instrumentalism to be as
effective when large numbers of people or different
institutions have to share the income generated from
wildlife and tourism activities. In the case of Campfire in
Zimbabwe, Bond (2001) found that in real terms the
median benefit per household from wildlife was US$4.49
in 1996. In most years the financial benefit per household
from wildlife revenue is low and constitutes less than
10% of gross agricultural production:
In terms of the proposed definitions of the financial
viability of wildlife it appears that in most wards wildlife is
not financially viable at the household level.
Consequently, in most wards, the current financial
incentives for institutional change for sustainable
management of wildlife and wildlife habitat are low
(Bond 2001:235).
In only a few Campfire wards is the household dividend
sufficient to make an impact.
A study of the ADMADE and LIRDP projects in
Zambia (Gibson 1999) concluded that illegal off-take of
wildlife in the late 1980s and early 1990s was continuing at
pre-project intervention levels partly because the
individual returns from hunting far outweighed a
residents share in the benefits that the projects could
deliver. In Namibia and Botswana very few community
wildlife management institutions have opted for direct
household dividends. High-earning conservancies in
Namibia and community trusts in Botswana have found
it difficult to decide how to use their wildlife income and
their earnings have sat in bank accounts accruing interest,
paying for running costs and funding some small-scale
community projects (Long et al. 2002; Jones 2002a). In
early 2002, a relatively low-earning conservancy in
Namibia, Salambala, distributed US$200 to each of its 19
constituent villages. About 7 000 people live in the
conservancy and membership is estimated at between
3 000 and 4 000.
However, there is evidence that economic instrumentalism
can work where income from wildlife is relatively high and
the number of beneficiaries is low or where beneficiaries
are particularly poor. Bond (2001) cites two examples
within Campfire: Kanyurira Ward in the Zambezi Valley
and Mahenye Ward in the south-east lowveld. In these
wards the average benefit per household from wildlife
revenue exceeded the index of gross agricultural
production in four of the five years between 1989 and
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1993. Bond concluded that there had been significant
institutional change within these wards towards the
management of wildlife and wildlife habitat. In
Mozambique, the Tchuma Tchato Project channels
revenue from safari hunting to local communities in areas
of the Zambezi Valley where there is little or no
government budget for public works and people are
extremely poor. Between 1996 and 2001 the project
generated about US$76 300 in community income.
Although the evidence for a decline in poaching and an
increase in wildlife is anecdotal, project staff (particularly
game scouts), are convinced that more wildlife is being
seen and that poaching has declined. Game scouts and
project staff ascribe the decrease in poaching to increased
co-operation from local residents who provide information
on a regular basis. It would appear that a combination of
regulation and control by the game scouts and the wildlife
income, which is used for grinding mills, improvements
to schools, village shops, and so on, has provided
incentives for changing behaviour (Jones 2002a).
In certain cases there is also scope for communities to
increase their income. Torra Conservancy in north-
western Namibia (352 200 ha) has one up-market
tourism lodge generating approximately US$50 000
annually. Trophy hunting is worth nearly US$18 000
annually and the sale of springbok raised an additional
US$13 000 in 2002. The size of the conservancy means
that it could certainly develop two more lodges without
causing environmental damage or spoiling the wilderness
experience for tourists. This would more than double the
existing income, making considerably more money
available for the 120 households, once operating costs of
around US$18 000 have been covered. In late 2002 the
conservancy distributed a dividend to members of N$630
(US$63), the first such distribution the conservancy has
made. Such an amount appears small in US dollar terms.
However, income of this nature needs to be seen in
context. For example, the average income of subsistence
farming households in Namibia is estimated at US$700 a
year, and for the poorest 20% of households around
US$200 a year (Ashley & Barnes 1996). There is evidence
from the region that even relatively small amounts of
income can be important to households when, for
example, they are used for things that require cash at a
specific time, such as school fees (Martin pers. comm.;
Ashley 1998).
Problems in devolving authority
There have also been problems in promoting the
devolution of authority over wildlife to local rural
communities. Several constraints can be identified.
Firstly, even where governments have changed policy and
legislation to assign rights to lower levels, this devolved
authority has usually been limited and conditional.
In Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe,
government sets quotas and issues permits for most uses
of wildlife. In Botswana and Zambia, communities tend
to be passive recipients of income from wildlife, without
engaging in active management, partly because the state
retains considerable management authority itself (Gujadur
2001; Gibson 1999). In Zambia, a government ban on
safari hunting in 2001 removed the main opportunity for
communities to gain income from wildlife.
Secondly, in Namibia and Botswana there have been
attempts by government to withdraw or withhold some
of the rights provided by policy or legislation. In Namibia
CBNRM legislation had been designed to remove the
need for conservancies to apply for permits and quotas
for own use of the category of huntable game species.
However, officials tried to reinterpret the legislation so
that such permits and quotas would have to be obtained.
In addition, the officials insisted that in order to gain use
rights conservancies would have to develop and submit a
management plan to government, when this was not
provided for in legislation (Corbett & Jones 2000). In
Botswana the government issued a decree that
community trusts should no longer be allowed to retain
the income from contracts with safari hunting and
tourism companies and this income would be held in
trust by district councils (Jones & Butterfield 2001). In
both cases communities and NGOs working with them
successfully resisted these attempts by government to
withhold or withdraw rights. However, in Namibia
proposed new wildlife legislation would remove the
rights that have already been given to communities.
In Zimbabwe legislation provides for appropriate
authority over wildlife to be given to rural district
councils, but the original intention of the Campfire policy
planners was that councils should devolve this authority
further to the ward level. Councils were encouraged by
implementation guidelines to carry out this further
devolution, but few have done so, or where this occurred,
occurred, authority has been re-centralised by councils. In
Namibia there is a need for further devolution from
conservancy level to smaller units within the community
to promote more direct involvement in decision making
by conservancy members.
The problems surrounding devolution of authority over
resources to local communities probably constitute the
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largest challenge facing CBNRM in the southern African
region. In many respects the contestation between
communities and government for power over wildlife as
a resource and the income it can generate is likely to be an
ongoing political struggle within CBNRM. The ability of
communities and other stakeholders in Namibia and
Botswana to resist government attempts to withdraw or
hold onto power is a positive sign. Other positive
developments in terms of devolution include the
increasing attention being given to the need to devolve
within existing community wildlife-management entities.
A model for such an approach exists within the Chobe
Enclave in Botswana where decision making over the use
of income has been devolved to village level trusts (Jones
2002b), which also develop their own community
development plans. Another model exists in the
Luangwa valley in Zambia where local village institutions
are the basic building block for decision making (Child et
al. 2001). In Zimbabwe, the most successful Campfire
areas are those where the rural district council has
devolved authority over wildlife to the ward level
providing local control over income and management
decision making.
Perhaps one of the main reasons for the problems facing
devolution to lower levels is the bureaucratic impulse to
hold on to power. According to Murphree:
Administrative bureaucracies require special attention
for programmes involving the devolution of proprietorship
to local levels, since there is an in-built tendency at any
level in bureaucratic hierarchies to seek increased
authority from levels above and resist its devolution to
levels below (1991:141).
However, there are some other factors that need
consideration. CBNRM in southern Africa has succeeded
in changing policy and legislation so that communities
can gain more rights over wildlife and more benefits.
However, often the policy and legislation was based on
existing statutes that were not necessarily ideal or
adequate. A number of compromises had to be made
because of the adaptation of existing policy and
legislation, and in order to operationalise the new
approaches (Jones & Murphree 2001).
In addition, although policy and legislation has changed,
the institutions expected to implement new CBNRM
approaches have not. There is a large gap between the
philosophy behind the new policy and legislation and the
institutional ethos of most organisations responsible for
applying the new approaches. Many wildlife officials do
not trust local communities to manage wildlife
sustainably and fear there will be no role for themselves if
management authority is devolved. Institutional reform
in southern African wildlife agencies needs to be
supported so that CBNRM is mainstreamed as an
acceptable conservation tool by officials.
The Tanzanian National Parks Agency (TANAPA)
provides an example of where such institutional reform
was achieved (Bergin 2001). A community conservation
approach was successfully mainstreamed using a number
of strategies. Community conservation was sold to
officials as being beneficial to their work and not
diminishing their authority   performance of park staff is
evaluated on the quality of relationships with neighbours,
not just whether the water-pumps work and the
numbers of elephants in the park. Community
conservation is applied as a tool alongside law
enforcement, not promoted as an alternative.
Applying collective proprietorship
The notion of collective proprietorship has been
difficult to apply in several contexts in the region. In some
countries such as Zimbabwe and Botswana, policy and
legislation pre-define communities through using
existing administrative units to determine the boundaries
of membership and jurisdiction. This is simpler and less
time-consuming than allowing communities to define
themselves (as in Namibia), but often brings together
villages or groups who would not necessarily usually co-
operate. In some cases in Namibia, community self-
definition has led to the re-opening of some long-
standing land, ethnic and tribal disputes between
different groups. In the Sesfontein Conservancy case, the
attempt to define the community for the emerging
conservancy took six years and the break up of the
proposed conservancy into three. But it is better that the
local disputes were settled before the conservancy was
registered by government and the disputes then
proceeded to tear it apart. Further, concern has been raised
in several quarters that the model of giving rights to
communities represented by committees enables local
elites to capture the decision-making processes and run
activities in their own interests. There is a need to ensure
that the majority of residents and resource users in fact
enjoy collective proprietorship.
There is also some evidence that communities find it
difficult to implement some of the institutional aspects
implied by the notion of collective proprietorship. In
Zambia, Gibson (1999) notes that the ADMADE and
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LIRDP projects did not identify and exclude from public
benefit those residents who continued to hunt illegally,
thus promoting free riding. In Namibia, some
conservancy committees are wrestling with the question
of whether all residents should benefit from wildlife
income even if they are not conservancy members. Their
dilemma also raises the issue of free riding where
individuals can continue to benefit without needing to
modify their resource-use activities. This is a crucial issue
of common property resource management that
communities will need to resolve internally. It is also a
question that is raised where communities opt for using
income for public works such as an additional classroom
for schools, rather than a household dividend from
which an individual or household can be more easily
excluded. In the case of the school classroom for example,
a person obeying the rules might be excluded from
benefit because he or she has no schoolgoing children,
but a regular poacher with children at school does in fact
benefit.
The new institutions of collective proprietorship that are
emerging under CBNRM face two crucial challenges. One
is to find space for themselves in the existing array of
overlapping and competing authorities that typically exist
in most communal areas of the region. In Namibia,
conservancies have to compete with traditional leaders
who have authority over land allocations as well as vague
legal duties to ensure sustainable use of renewable natural
resources within their area of jurisdiction. The Ministry of
Agriculture, Water and Rural Development and the
Ministry of lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation, also
affect land use and allocation. Community forest
committees and community water-point committees are
being given authority over natural resources in different
sectoral legislation to the wildlife laws. A similar situation
exists in Zimbabwe where Bond (2001) notes that the
enabling legislation for use and control of most natural
resources is fragmented and resource-specific. Such a
situation also gives rise to overlapping authorities and
competing institutions. Where such situations exist, new
resource management institutions find it difficult to
make decisions that they can enforce without being
undermined by some competing institution.
A second crucial challenge for the new institutions is to
gain internal legitimacy. This is problematic where
community wildlife management units are pre-
determined by existing state administrative units as
noted above. Internal legitimacy will be greater if social
units are relatively cohesive and collaboration is voluntary.
However, internal legitimacy will also be promoted if the
new institutions can deliver benefits that are important to
members (whether these are financial, or intangible).
Long-enduring common property resource management
institutions have evolved over time (Ostrom 1990) and
few of the new CBNRM institutions in southern Africa
have been in existence for more than a few years. It will
take time for these institutions to be tested, reviewed and
adapted by their members before internal legitimacy is
achieved.
CBNRM approaches in southern Africa typically bestow
resource rights on local communities, but not land rights.
This is a critical weakness of these approaches that has yet
to be dealt with adequately. Throughout the region
communal land is typically owned by the state and local
communities enjoy user rights over the resources on the
land that are strongly conditional and are not tenurially
secure (Murphree 1995). A crucial requirement for
sustainable resource management and the self-
determination of rural people is for communities to be
able to gain strong collective proprietorship over the land
as well as over individual resources. In Namibia, for
example, conservancies that develop land-use plans that
set areas aside for wildlife and tourism can do little if a
person from a neighbouring area moves a large herd of
cattle on to that land. A conservancy can do little if the
government decides to use communal land for a
development project  the land belongs to the state. New
land legislation passed in 2002 has slightly improved the
ability of conservancies to control developments that
conflict with their management and land-use plans, but
the tenurial insecurity remains. Throughout the region,
attempts to promote private group land tenure have met
with considerable resistance from politicians. In South
Africa a new minister threw out such proposals in draft
legislation in 2000 and a satisfactory approach is still being
lobbied for. Attempts to implement the legal provisions
for local common property associations in South Africa
have proved problematic. In Zimbabwe, proposals made
by a land reform commission (Rukuni 1994) for the
introduction of group tenure based on village units was
ignored by government. Mozambique appears to have
gone the furthest in the region with enabling local
communities to gain secure tenure over their land, but the
government is doing little to promote implementation
of its own legal provisions and is still doing major deals
with the private sector regarding the use of large tracts of
communal land.
Lessons learnt from the philosophy and practice of CBNRM in Southern Africa
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The South African land restitution policy is one of the few
examples of communities being able to gain some form
of secure tenure over their land. In this case, communities
that have land restored, which was forcibly appropriated
under apartheid are able to gain title over the land. Several
communities in South Africa have taken advantage of the
legislation. The Makuleke community bordering the
Kruger National Park successfully launched a claim to
regain land from which they were removed when the park
was formed. Under the settlement they will not re-occupy
the land, but title has been restored to them. They will
gain the income from all wildlife use and tourism on the
restored land. A similar settlement has been made with
the Khomani San in the former Kalahari Gemsbok Park
(now part of the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park). They
have been given 25 000 ha within the park, which will be
run on a contractual basis by the park authorities.
Most approaches to improving relationships between
state-owned PAs and their neighbours do not involve a
change in tenure and authority over decision making.
Although not the choice of the South African parks
authorities, this tenure change is what has happened and
it creates an important model for dealing with similar
circumstances elsewhere in the region. Local residents
have been removed from PAs in all countries in the
region and there should be moral obligation on
governments to provide adequate compensation. In
most cases this has not been done and the restoration of
land on the South African model would be an
appropriate way of dealing not only with the moral issue,
but also with practical and political issues of trying to gain
legitimacy for state-owned PAs.
Issues of scale
It has been difficult in many cases to achieve appropriate
matches between ecological scale and social scale in
many CBNRM contexts. In Caprivi in Namibia there are
a number of conservancies geographically small (up to
19 000ha) with relatively large numbers of residents (up
to 6 000). Because of their small size and large numbers of
people they do not qualify for elephant-hunting quotas
to be allocated to each conservancy. They will have to
develop collaborative arrangements in order to benefit
from most forms of wildlife utilisation, and essentially
scale up their management activities. In both north-east
and north-west Namibia conservancies have begun to
combine into regional forums for better regional
communication and advocacy. These forums could also
emerge as aggregated management institutions for
wildlife at a regional level. The break up of the Sesfontein
Conservancy in north-west Namibia into three separate
conservancies represents an attempt by residents to
establish units that were functional in terms of
geographical size as well as sufficiently cohesive social
units. In Chobe in Botswana, the division of the Chobe
Enclave Conservation Trust into a number of smaller
village trusts is also an attempt to deal with issues of scale.
Community empowerment
Community empowerment is a key element of southern
African CBNRM programmes and progress in this regard
has been mixed. As mentioned above, governments have
not fully empowered communities to manage wildlife
resources, retaining significant powers for themselves.
Further, the reliance on donor funding and NGO
support for CBNRM implementation often has
unintended consequences in terms of restricting the
extent of community empowerment. Community
wildlife management committees such as conservancies,
trusts, ward committees, and so on, tend to become
accountable upwards to the organisations that provide
funding and technical support rather than downwards to
the organisations members (Child et al. 2001).
Empowerment in terms of greater technical knowledge
and understanding of wildlife management and the
tourism industry, enhanced skills in organisational
management, and exposure to new ideas and arenas,
tends to be concentrated in the hands of the committee
members.
Increasingly attempts are being made by CBNRM
practitioners to assist communities to develop their own
vision of the future and to channel service provision
through the communitys own development plans. In
Namibia, in one conservancy in the north-west a  coalition
has been formed between a number of government
agencies, NGOs and donor-funded projects known as
the Forum for Integrated Resource Management. This
grouping is trying to provide ongoing support to the
conservancy and a local farmers union based on the aims
and objectives of the conservancy rather than the sectoral
agendas or mandates of the member organisations.
Lessons learnt
The data and analysis in the paper above point to a
number of key lessons learned from the philosophy and
practice of CBNRM in southern Africa.
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A mix of economic incentives and strong proprietorship
has had positive impacts on freehold land. On
communal land, governments have not fully applied the
same principles, particularly with regard to devolving
strong proprietorship. Rights over wildlife given to
communities remain limited and conditional. Despite
these limitations, there has been a strong response from
communities across the region wanting to gain benefits
from wildlife and tourism. Incomes to communities
have increased and there have been conservation benefits.
There are now 15 community conservancies in Namibia
managing 4 million ha of land with more than 200 000
wild animals including endangered black rhino, endemic
species such as Hartmanns mountain zebra, and large
parts of Namibias elephant population. Important
habitats managed by these communal area conservancies
include the western escarpment of the central plateau,
which is a major centre of endemism, seasonal and
permanent wetlands, northern broad-leafed woodlands,
and west-flowing rivers which form linear oases in the
Namib desert. Several communal area conservancies have
set aside some of their land as core wildlife and tourism
areas within broader land-use plans, and wildlife has been
re-introduced to at least three conservancies.
In Zimbabwe more than 100 000 communal area
households benefit from wildlife income and hunting
and tourism on freehold and communal land is worth
US$1 billion. Some communal area communities in
Zimbabwe have zoned their land to include wildlife areas
and other areas for crops and livestock.
In Botswana more than 120 villages are involved in
community management of wildlife and other natural
resources, and income to local communities (mostly
through institutions called  community trusts) is worth
around US$1 250 000. The number of CBOs involved in
CBNRM has grown from five in 1993 to 130 in 2001.
Large areas of land outside PAs are maintained under
wildlife as an important land use, particularly around the
Moremi Game Reserve and the Chobe National Park, but
also in the more arid areas of the western Kalahari desert.
Elephants are no longer viewed by local communities as
just a problem animal, but as a valuable commodity with
a minimum community income of US$12 000.
However, there are a number of constraints to further
conservation progress:
! Governments are trying to hold onto power over
wildlife or take back what power they have devolved.
This is due to a natural bureaucratic impulse to resist
devolution. It is also because a gap has developed
between the philosophy embedded in policy and
legislation and the philosophy of the organisations
expected to implement community-based approaches.
! Security of tenure over land is an important
foundation for sustainable management of land and
resources by local communities. Without such
security of tenure many attempts to manage
individual resources sustainably are undermined.
! Land restitution initiatives in South Africa linked to
PAs provide useful models for situations in other
countries where people have been removed from
their land for the establishment of game reserves.
! Economic incentives are difficult to apply where
income has to be divided between large numbers of
people and/or different institutions. However,
economic incentives can have an impact where income
is relatively high, where there are small numbers of
people, and where income accrues directly to local
residents.
! Economic incentives above are not sufficient,
particularly where income to households is relatively
small. It is crucial to ensure that strong proprietorship
is devolved to local jurisdictions. Local managers
need to be able to determine the level and methods of
use without requiring quotas and permits from
government.
! CBNRM is at its most effective where economic
benefits are perceived by residents to be high/useful
and devolution reaches the lowest appropriate levels.
! CBNRM programmes in the region have tended to
focus on empowering committees that represent
relatively large numbers of people. This creates the
danger of a centralisation of decision making
removed from the lowest appropriate levels.
! A number of examples are emerging where scaling up
is beginning to take place with the lowest levels such
as village bodies forming the foundations of
accountable natural resource management governance
systems.
The way forward
Despite problems and constraints, there is sufficient
evidence from experience on freehold and communal
land in southern Africa to suggest that conservation of
wildlife and other natural resources need not be confined
to formally proclaimed state-run areas. The lessons from
the philosophy and practice of CBNRM point to the need
Lessons learnT from the philosophy and practice of CBNRM in Southern Africa
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for a number of strategies that can improve the
performance of community-based approaches:
! Current policy and legislation should be revised on
the basis of the evidence linking sustainable
management with strong proprietorship and strong
economic incentives. This implies the strengthening
of the rights of local communities over their land and
natural resources. Governments should give up their
hold over crucial areas of decision making and
maintain an overall regulatory/supervisory function
rather than a control function. Devolution should be
based on the lowest appropriate level of jurisdiction.
From there, scaling up should take place, where
necessary, through the delegation of authority
upwards. This principle should be applied within
communities as well as between communities and
other levels. The emphasis should be on accountability
downwards.
! In order to increase the impact of economic benefits,
income should reach household level. Support
agencies need to give more attention to methods of
income distribution that promote direct household
benefit (for example, the household distributions
pioneered by Campfire where recipients then return
any cash earmarked for community projects).
Decision making about use of income should be
taken at village level rather than at the supra-
committee level, ensuring greater participation by
residents. Communities should be supported in
maximising their income generation opportunities
within acceptable environmental and social limits and
taking into account tourist carrying capacities.
! Institutional reform of wildlife agencies needs to be
promoted and supported so that CBNRM can be
mainstreamed and accepted by officials. The gap
between the philosophy embodied in policy and the
philosophy of the implementing institutions needs
to be closed.
! CBNRM practitioners should continue to lobby for
secure group tenure over communal land. Group
land rights that include rights of exclusion should
be promoted as a fundamental prerequisite for
sustainable management and the establishment of
CCAs. Models such as those used in South Africa for
the restitution of land rights for communities that
lost their land under apartheid should be developed
for PAs. This would restore proprietorship over the
land to communities which were evicted from their
land for the establishment of PAs. CBNRM as a
movement needs to engage more directly in the
debates and processes concerning land reform in
southern Africa.
! PA managers should explore the opportunities
provided by CBNRM activities on park borders.
There is the opportunity to develop synergies and
partnerships with communities that are using wildlife
and setting aside land for wildlife and tourism. Few
countries in the region have exploited such
opportunities. PAs and neighbouring communities
that have adopted wildlife and tourism as land uses
still work in isolation and often conflict. The
opportunities for developing synergies and
partnerships will be strengthened where communities
have strong tenure over land and resources and can
enter into negotiations with PA authorities as equals.
1. Devolution in this context is viewed as the surrender by
the state of elements of authority and responsibility to
units with non-state constituencies. Decentralisation is
viewed as a structural dispersal of state control to sub-
units of the state apparatus in a bureaucratic hierarchy
(following    Jones & Murphree 2001).
2. South Africa has also transferred ownership of wildlife
to landholders and grants exemptions to farms with
suitable fencing so that hunting, capture and the sale of
game can take place year round. The wildlife industry in
South Africa is estimated to have grown at a mean rate of
5.6% a year from 1993 to 2000 when there were 5 061
exempted wildlife ranches, covering about 10 364 000 ha
(Bothma 2002).
3. The impacts of land reform and the invasion of white-
owned farms on conservancies such as Save are discussed
in another paper in this volume.
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Introduction
The topic of local communities and natural resource
conservation in southern Africa has now accumulated
over 500 research publications. If I had to summarise in a
few sentences the net import of all the socio-economic
research findings on communities and conservation in
southern Africa since 1980, they amount very simply to
the following:
! devolution of authority to communities or
landholders for conservation and sustainable use of
wild resources is a cardinal input (Murphree &
Mazambani 2002)
! the promotion of economic value for wild resources
provides a positive incentive to conserve and develop
wildlife management as a land use (Metcalfe 1998) 
provided it is coupled with the first postulate.
For many of us in the conservation and sustainable-use
field, there was little to add to these two tenets until
Murphree (2000) pushed the envelope further with the
concept that it is not enough to create a scattering of
strong local jurisdictions. In order for these devolved
units to meet the challenges of larger ecological and
functional scales, it is necessary to create a hierarchy of
cascaded institutions (Martin 1999) to match
jurisdictional imperatives:
! scaling down, to be sustainable, requires scaling up
(Murphree 2000).
This summary may seem somewhat abrupt and
dismissive of much research effort. However, to an
implementer as opposed to an academic researcher, these
are the key principles to be applied to land outside state-
protected conservation areas. Moreover, although the
research has been focused mainly on local communities in
communal lands, the findings apply equally to private
land and transitional land (which I shall define shortly).
Perhaps, too, they are relevant to state PAs (for which I
will use the term national parks hereinafter because it is
less cumbersome  although, strictly speaking, in all
southern Africa countries there are categories of state PAs
which are not national parks).
An examination of the given title of this paper suggests
that the focus should be on national parks, although it
does not preclude consideration of land outside them.
The phrase at the national level could be interpreted as
an invitation to scrutinise government natural-resource
policies in general. However, with this papers intent
being to contribute to the coming WPC in 2003, I intend
to place the major emphasis on national parks and give
only a summary treatment of the remaining land. And
since the majority of national parks in southern Africa
were established to protect wildlife and its habitats, I will
stop using ponderous phrases to refer to natural
resources in general and use the word wildlife, being at
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I do not subscribe readily to the idea that a national park
is the pinnacle of conservation  given the many examples
of failing state PAs in southern Africa and the many
successful conservation examples outside PAs where
wildlife management is the chosen form of land use.
Effective conservation of wildlife takes place on unsettled
land, whether inside or outside national parks, and must
mean the continuous maintenance of viable animal
populations and their habitats. All that may differ is the
size of area, with national parks generally being larger than
most private or communal land ventures.
There is a lower limit in size below which conservation of
most large mammal species is not practical (Martin 2002).
Parker and Graham (1989a, 1989b) found that elephants
disappeared from areas where human densities exceeded
15 per km2. The implications of this finding are that there
is little point in expending effort to develop wildlife as a
land use in areas where human densities exceed about 20
persons per km2   the empirical evidence suggests that,
even without illegal hunting, conditions are not
conducive to wildlife survival.
I have argued with Parker (pers. comm.) that the
distribution of human settlement is more important
than the absolute densities  in theory, if all the people in
a given area lived in one small corner of the football
pitch, the remainder of the area would still be available
for [the] game. This is, however, contrary to the
established patterns of settlement in communal lands.
The point is not frivolous. If the highest valued land use
for a given area lies in wildlife management, then this is
denied to people when their densities become too high
and they are forced to adopt lower-valued land use
systems, which will further exacerbate their poverty.
Murphree and Mazambani (2002) discuss meanings of
the word equity and suggest the most current usage of
the term implies the elimination of gross disparities
arising from situations or structures which concentrate
and maintain power in the hands of a narrow band of
elites:
Equity is thus a relative, dynamic and subjective concept
arising from both material conditions and normative
perceptions.  Equity in effect becomes a synonym for
legitimacy  the legitimacy of structures and processes
of entitlements, controls and obligations that hold a
broad social consensus of normative support.
One might add that this epitomises working democracy.
The derived adjective equitable should imply the
situation where equity has been achieved.
To finalise the dissection of the title of this paper the word
conservation should come under the microscope. I believe
that the noble objective of maintaining viable ecosystems
and species populations has been severely disadvantaged
by treating conservation as a special case in the arena of
human activities under which the normal financial and
socio-economic systems, which regulate all other aspects
of human commerce, are suspended. Southern Africa is
fortunate in that it is able to obtain high returns from
wildlife management on land that is incapable of producing
sustained incomes under conventional agricultural systems.
Indeed, on some lands where wildlife management and
agriculture are both potentially viable, wildlife shows
superior qualities because of its marketing advantages.
Cattle will never be sold for more than the commodity
value of beef, milk and hides: wildlifes ceiling value
seems to be determined only by marketing skills. Given
this, there is very little justification for mounting crusades
to save species or wild areas  or subsidise inefficient state
systems that are incapable of producing the income
necessary to maintain national parks.
There is an additional economic dimension to
investment in wildlife as a land use. The annual returns
from wildlife tourism enterprises (including sport
hunting) are, in the case of private land, secondary to the
capital value, which arises from the investment (Ivan
Bond, pers. comm.). As long as there is a demand for
large tracts of Africa in pristine condition, land under
wildlife will have a high value regardless of the immediate
income it is capable of producing. Those that acquire
wealth in other sectors of national economies will wish to
spend it on recreation and lifestyles based on the African
wilderness. This is not true for tracts of land that cannot
be bought and sold  such as communal land and
national parks  to their own disservice.
This is becoming a lengthy introduction and the
perceptive reader might suspect that the author is
searching for a suitable framework within which to
develop the theme. I do have a plan. My extended
immersion in the world of consultancy indicates that this
topic may be best approached in the form of a strategy.
The elements of any strategy are:
! Where are we now?
! Where do we want to be?
! How will we get there?
! How will we know when we have got there?
As an additional dimension I will also base the discourse
on land-tenure categories. In the table on the next page I
make two broad divisions  state PAs and other land.
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Other land has been further subdivided into private
land, communal land and transitional land  a term
coined for the Zimbabwe situation which includes the
entire mixty-maxty set of existing resettlement schemes,
conservancies and large commercial farms in the process
of takeover. The status of title to this land is confused.
The two shaded areas in the table  the status quo and a
vision for national parks  form the main part of this
paper. The tenure rights and the institutional systems
needed for effective conservation on other land have
been more than adequately dealt with by other authors in
this publication and I shall give them no more than a
cursory treatment.
Inevitably, being a Zimbabwean and being closely
involved with the situation in Zimbabwe, a bias will




The minimum requirement for effective protection of
wildlife in African national parks has been estimated by a
number of authors. Parker (1979) compiled a list of most
of the parks in sub-Saharan Africa and subjectively ranked
them in categories of success and failure. He found that
there was a strong correlation between those parks with
an annual recurrent expenditure greater than US$200/
km2 and their successful wildlife management. Cumming,
Martin and Taylor (1981) examined budgets available to
state conservation agencies; Bell et al. (1992) and
numerous other papers examined requirements for law
enforcement in parks; Dublin et al. (1995) examined the
effects of operating budgets on the performance of
African elephant range states; and Jachmann (1998)
produced a definitive work on law-enforcement
requirements in African savanna rangelands. Martin has
developed formulae that give a crude estimate of the
number of field staff, the required operating costs and the
necessary capital expenditure for a park of any given size.
These budgets set a critical threshold. Where the state
provides an annual operating budget equal to or greater
than the requirements, there is a high probability that the
national park will be adequately managed and conserved.
Where budgets are lower than the amounts needed, it is
unlikely that a wildlife agency will be able to protect
resources against any determined onslaught by illegal
hunters. The losses of black rhino in Zambia and
Zimbabwe in the 1970s and 1980s were the direct result
of under-funding of and under-staffing in the parks
where the species occurred.
With the possible exception of Botswana and South
Africa, the staff complements and recurrent expenditure
for parks in all southern African countries fall
considerably short of these levels. In some countries, the
numbers of staff are close to the required threshold (for
example, Malawi and Zambia), but the budgets are too
low for the staff to operate effectively. In others, such as
Mozambique and Angola, both the staff numbers and
budgets are a fraction of the requirement.
The result is that illegal hunting is rife in the majority of
parks (excepting Botswana and South Africa) and
management (such as the maintenance of artificial water
supplies, roads and firebreaks, wildlife capture and
translocation, and population regulation) is totally
missing. De la Harpe (1998) has argued that the soundest
strategy for a state wildlife agency is to seek financial self-
sufficiency for each PA under its control and to divest
itself of areas that are economically unsustainable. The
1950s notion that the running costs for national parks
should be met from taxpayers revenues is untenable in
African economies in the 21st century.
Conditions for effective, stable and equitable conservation at the national level
Framework for analysis of national level conservation
performance
State protected Other land
areas Private Communal transitional
The status quo Centralist models which are Differ only in degree of devolved authority  none have
failing the ideal situation
The vision Increased role of stake- All need full devolution of rights over wild resources;
holders in park alignment of authority, responsibility and incentives
management institutions for addressing issues of ecological scale
Inducing change Ultimately, must come from demands of strong political constituencies
Monitoring All require self-diagnosing adaptive management systems
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The functional failure in the parks has, in turn, led to
more sinister activities. In three southern African
countries in which I have worked in the past two years the
parks are subject to massive commercial meat-hunting
rackets and/or hardwood timber exploitation by the staff
themselves, both for their individual gain and for the
profit of senior civil servants. It is doubtful in these cases
whether the restoration of adequate operating budgets
would rectify the situation since it is the vocational
commitment of local and senior leadership that is
missing.
There are moves afoot in a number of countries (Malawi,
Mozambique, South Africa and Zambia) to engage
neighbouring communities in the management of the
parks in a more meaningful role. The Makuleke example
in Kruger National Park is among the more advanced of
these and may prove to be significant. Elsewhere, these
initiatives are not characterised by any sincere intention on
the part of state bureaucracies to admit local communities
through the portals to the hallowed realm of decision
making  rather, the entire exercise is seen as granting local
communities limited resource-extraction rights from the
parks which, as Barrett and Arcese (1995) have pointed
out, is likely to lead to positive feedback spirals where
demands and expectations rise exponentially.
Other land
In no southern African  country can it be claimed that the
first necessary condition for successful conservation
outside national parks, that of devolution of authority
for natural resources to landholders, has been fully met.
Martin (2002) summarised the situation in southern
African countries and concluded that the process was in
its infancy. Corbett and Jones (2000) refer to the process
in Namibia as aborted devolution1 and note that,
despite Namibias much touted conservancy policies, the
state still continues to set quotas for consumptive use
and to allocate concessions within conservancies  actions
which weaken any nascent institution attempting to take
on responsibility for its resources.
There is only one example in southern Africa (that I am
aware of) of the full devolution of authority over wildlife
to entities outside the state and that is the granting of
appropriate authority to private landholders in
Zimbabwe under the provisions of the Parks and
Wildlife Act of 1975. In 1996 the Ministry of the
Environment and Tourism sought to temper this right
through subsidiary legislation,2 by demanding that
wildlife farmers register with the ministry, submit annual
wildlife management plans to the Wildlife Department
and have quotas approved by the Director of Wildlife.
However, the regulation was disregarded by landholders
and became yet one more example of the authoritative
reach of the State exceeding its implementational grasp
(Murphree 2000). Of surpassing importance now is the
present status of private land under wildlife and the
erstwhile landholders.
The Zimbabwean government is currently attempting to
develop new wildlife policies to accommodate large tracts
of private land under wildlife into its fast-track land
reform process. Whilst appearing to recognise that
wildlife is a suitable land use for certain areas (see the final
discussion on technicist/centrist policies), the states
current preoccupation is with trying to define the
minimum sizes of land units which will be viable for
wildlife with the aim of subdividing the conservancies
into smaller land parcels  an action which will reduce
their overall ecological viability. Although the fate of these
conservancies may appear to be a peculiarly Zimbabwean
problem, there may be lessons to be learned of value to
the entire region.
A vision
Devolution is an approach which faces strong and
entrenched opposition. The State, its private sector allies
and its bureaucracies have their own appropriative
interests in local resources and the state is loath to
legitimate local jurisdictions in ways that diminish their
ability to claim the benefits of these resources.  This
tendency, more than any other factor, is responsible for
the failure of programmes ostensibly designed to create
local natural resource management jursidictions
(Murphree & Mazambani 2002:53).
I submit this pronouncement applies as much to state
PAs as to other land. In the time I worked for the
Zimbabwe government both before and after
independence, I was strongly aware of an extractive
process under which a flow of monies derived from
resources located in marginal areas far from the capital city
moved to central government coffers. These revenues
were not reinvested in the areas from which they
originated  rather they were deployed elsewhere in the
economy with a net effect of strengthening the centre and
weakening the periphery. When a potentially valuable
resource was discovered in communal lands, instead of
allowing this to become the business and entitlement of
local communities or district councils, government
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would immediately alienate the land on which the
resource occurred and shift its management to a central
authority.
There is a continuous demand on government for the
allocation of revenues from the fiscus to alleviate poverty
and meet human needs in all remote areas of the country.
The stronger local economies become, the less of a
financial burden these areas are to the state. Amongst the
devolutionary options open to governments are those of
treating national parks as regional, district or local assets 
and there are strong arguments to indicate that, far from
prejudicing the parks primary ecological functions, it
might even enhance them.
State protected areas
The March 2002 issue of the Common Property Digest
(No 60)3 was dedicated to the subject of PAs and the
contribution which social science scholarship might make
to influencing national PA policies. Murphree (2002) has
written the lead article and it is followed by responses
from a number of authors. Murphrees article opens the
door for questioning a number of axioms characterising
state PAs and I have attempted to extract the key concepts
as follows:
! PAs have generally been uncritically linked with state
ownership and management.
! The IUCN definition of a PA, however, makes no
mention of state ownership.
! The IUCN World Commission on Protected Areas
tends primarily to assign intrinsic and aesthetic
conservation values to PAs.
! Other IUCN commissions observe that PAs address
only a fraction of global biodiversity concerns and
point out the sense of alienation experienced by local
peoples whose land and resources have been
expropriated to create national parks.
! These commissions advocate inclusive policies where
local people, acting collectively, are provided with
incentives to take responsibility for and benefit from
the economic development which PAs can provide;
! Similar policy shifts are occurring in a number of
international conservation and development agencies
and the old notion of fortress conservation is being
displaced by new ideas of development through
community conservation and sustainable use.
! Performance of projects based on these new
approaches has generally been well below expectations.
Amongst the proximate reasons for failure are the
following:
- Cohesive communities have been hard to
identify.
- Incentives for cohesion are absent or do not cover
the transaction costs involved in developing or
maintaining cohesion.
- The process requires time frames well beyond the
impatient log frames of conventional donor
project development.
- Conservationists have tended to colonise and
capture projects and local actors have diverted
projects away from their central objectives.
! The ultimate and most fundamental reason for
failure has been that the critical ingredient for project
success, that of devolution of authority and
responsibility, has been missing.
! Governments (and NGO implementing agencies)
have continued to:
- retain ultimate power to shape objectives and
control benefits
- see community involvement as the same thing as
compliance
- see participation as the same thing as co-opting
communities
- be reluctant, as politicians and bureaucrats, to
surrender the power and control of access to
resources which is essential for robust devolution.
Hence most of the projects involving communities in
natural resource management have simply become an
exercise in aborted devolution. The result of this is a
backlash where disillusionment has set in at local,
national and international levels. Two reactions are
emerging from the failures:
! One group wants to return to fortress-type PAs, for
example, Conservation Internationals Back to the
barriers policy.
! The other group, informed largely by social scientists,
wants to see the critical ingredients for success
included in the recipe.
Murphree argues that PAs are no more than another
form of commons  areas set aside for a constituency
which require protection through controls on their access
and use. Seen as an area of commons, a number of false
perceptions need to disappear  PAs do not have to be
managed by the state, they are not about use versus non-
use, and they are not about exclusion rather than
regulated access.
Conditions for effective, stable and equitable conservation at the national level
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Other land
Murphree (2000) stresses the need for alignment of
authority, responsibility and incentives as follows:
! Authority without responsibility is meaningless or
obstructive.
! Responsibility without authority cannot be effective.
! Without responsibility or authority, there are no
incentives to invest, manage or control.
In their recent study, Murphree and Mazambani found
that:
the attitude of local peoples to [government] policy and
implementation... is ambivalent  a mixture of
recognition that authority is necessary, a resignation to
State intrusions, and doubts as to its motivations and
efficacy (2002:45).
It is precisely the lack of alignment described above which
explains this attitude.
Murphree (2000) observes that most planners and
bureaucrats see devolution of power as a step-by-step
process under which communities are granted powers
incrementally as they demonstrate the ability to manage.
This is a Catch 22 situation. Authority is a pre-requisite
for responsible management and should not be held out
as a reward for it. Devolution carries with it the
responsibility for organisation, management, control,
self-sufficiency and, above all, for developing
resourcefulness. These attributes cannot be imposed but
must be developed experimentally in the local setting.
Without authority, such experiments are defective. The
stimulus arises not from the anticipation of future
entitlement, but from the imperative of immediate
empowerment.
Inducing Change
It is a sorry testament to the discredit of government
conservation bureaucracies throughout Africa that there
does not appear to be a single example where a full
partnership arrangement for the running of a national
park has been achieved. Whilst state conservation agencies
will accept donations towards their needs, they have
always insisted that such assistance be unconditional.
Murphree (2000) examines situations where
breakthroughs in the creation of local jurisdictions (with
varying degrees of autonomy) have occurred and the
inducements in his typology are listed below:
! Change may come about through the efforts of
enlightened bureaucrats who see that the achievement
of larger goals requires the reform.
! The transformation may occur through the political
process where a strong political constituency makes
demands which a government cannot afford to ignore.
! Situations where the vested interests of stakeholders
coincide with those of local governance structures may
also induce change.
! Situations where governments approved policies
whose implications they did not understand at the
time.
There is an innate drive in Zimbabwe and some other
southern African countries to reassert patronage systems
under which governments are highly visible in
distributing benefits to local communities  even if the
largesse concerned has been produced and earned by the
communities in the first place. In Namibia, despite
enlightened policies and supportive legislation,
implementational practice frequently disempowers local
communities (Corbett & Jones 2000:23). In the mid-
1990s, Botswana led southern African countries in
devolutionary measures by granting sweeping rights to
many communities in remote areas and removing
intermediate layers of bureaucracy. Much of this reform
would fall in the first category of Murphrees typology 
being the actions of enlightened bureaucrats.
Unfortunately, these innovations were not underpinned
by legislation and were very much at the whim of the
senior officials of the day.
Ultimately, the vision for new models in national parks
and strong local jurisdictions outside them will come
about only through demands from strong political
constituencies  and this requires the proper functioning
of democratic systems. The quote below from Murphree
and Mazambani is an appropriate note on which to end
this section:
Expectations for the present must be tempered by the
recognition that common property resources are currently
hostage to larger politico-economic realities... This is not
to suggest that the grail of good common property policy
and practice is not worth pursuing (2002:40).
Monitoring
At a first glance the topic of monitoring would appear not
to fit within the scope of the title of this paper. It is, in
fact, a condition for effective conservation. And, having
embarked upon a strategy approach to the subject
matter, it is necessary to touch on the subject. Lastly, the
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recommended methodology of adaptive management
has a direct philosophical link to a command and control
attitude prevalent in southern African governments and
bureaucracies.
In all problems of managing the environment we are
faced with a complex of uncertainties  and these
uncertainties increase as we progress to higher-order
systems. In managing a single species it may be possible
to limit the number of important variables for analysis to
a few but, as we progress towards management at the
ecosystem level, the number of unknowns multiplies
exponentially. The problem will not be solved by
collecting massive amounts of data on all the
components of the ecosystem, since it is the interrelated
functioning of all the parts that defies synthesis. Adaptive
management (Holling 1978) recognises the inevitability
of management interventions in higher-order systems
characterised by inherent uncertainties and, accordingly,
requires each act of management to be structured as an
experiment.
Adaptive management is characterised by feedback loops
at all stages and a willingness to adjust goals, hypotheses,
objectives and management actions. Bell (1986) makes
the important point that adaptive management need not
be confined to ecological issues. It can be applied in the
broadest sense to any complex system and can be
designed to take into account political, economic and
social effects. Lee (1993:9) treats all policies as experiments
to be evaluated using adaptive management  an
uncomfortable notion for the arch-bureaucrat or
blueprint advocate.
Hulme and Edwards (1997:18) are critical of such rigid
plans where inflexibility is built into the design of projects
from the outset. Chambers (1996) notes:
 .... Demands for accountability upward are believed to
require systematic planning. Rightly or wrongly, those
who receive funds are not trusted to plan well. So donors
demand the use of logical framework analysis and its
subspecies GOPP (GTZ 1988), and ZOPP (objective-
oriented planning) and the like.
Miller et al. (1997)4 include adaptive management as a
component of decentralisation5 and thoroughly confuse
the two issues. Their blueprint for devolution is a
cautious one, basically advising governments not to let go
the reins until a large number of assurances are in place.
The list of constraints is sufficiently long to preclude
devolution and fails to recognise experience from the
field, which indicates unequivocally that devolution is a
prior requirement for overcoming the obstacles they
enumerate. Adaptive management is not seen as an
activity which can be left to those to whom responsibility
has been devolved but one which requires:
... time-consuming consultative processes and careful
coordination of activities among governments and
institutions both at the central and local levels.
Elsewhere in the document, it is clear that the authors are
more comfortable with an emphasis on best available
science, which is seen as something separate from
adaptive management and suggests reliance on massive
biological inventories and increased research to reduce
uncertainties.
Holling and Meffe (1996) describe the syndrome of many
environmental management agencies which, having
made a small successful advance as a result of applying the
first step in adaptive management, then throw away the
recipe book, discontinue monitoring and continue to
apply the same management measure without assessing
its further impacts. There is an inherent human
propensity to slide into command and control mode.
Discussion
I have drawn heavily on Murphree and Mzamabani
(2002) throughout this paper and, indeed, their analysis
of current common property policy issues in Zimbabwe
is so perceptive that it might have been preferable to
consider their study in full rather than a hotchpotch laden
with disjointed quotations. There is perhaps one area in
which, as analysts, they are culpable of omission. They
provide a fairly damning description of a policy of State
custodianship and communal/resettlement land
wardship)6 and a technicist, centrist and proscriptive
approach to policy and give historical origins as the
proximate reasons for the situation. But they fail to make
the final extrapolation that the ultimate factor motivating
the drive to centralise and bureaucratise is the
enhancement of individual wealth and power within a
ruling élite. Corruption is an area on which the authors are
silent.
I believe that this syndrome is not general and, much of
the time where it does occur, it is not always the product
of a primary conscious motive: it is innate and deeply
embedded in the subconscious. In my period in post-
independence government, time and again I observed
situations where bureaucrats sought to position
themselves as the gate-keepers for any activity that might
Conditions for effective, stable and equitable conservation at the national level
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involve the issue of a permit, licence or concession. To
achieve this it was often necessary to go against existing
provisions of the law or to withdraw rights and powers
which had been legally granted to members of the public.
But it was done. Had the individuals concerned been
confronted with the accusation that they were corrupt,
they would have exhibited righteous horror. They would
have advanced reasons such as the protection of the
integrity of national assets. But a year later, they would
own a Mercedes Benz. And as they rose in power and
joined the ruling elite, their influence became magnified.
The antidote lies in the proper practice of democracy 
which is a plant suffering the effects of a shallow root
system in some parts of southern Africa savannas at the
moment.
1. A phrase which may have originated from Murphree
(2000).
2. This was Statutory Instrument No 26 of 1996, created
under a subsection of the primary legislation which
enables the Minister to make regulations for a range of
wildlife activities. In law, it is not possible (or correct) to
attempt to use a regulation to alter the legal intent of
primary legislation and, had the statutory instrument
been tested in court, it would have been disallowed.
3. The Common Property Resource Digest is a quarterly
publication of the International Association for the Study
of Common Property.
4. This paper was presented for comment by the
participants at the 3rd meeting of the Subsidiary Body on
Scientific, Technical & Technological Advice (SBSTTA) of
the CBD in Montreal from 15 September 1997. It has
since been generally released without modifications,
despite numerous comments.
5. Miller et al. (1997) also confuse decentralisation with
the intended word devolution. Murphree and
Mazambani (2002:53) make the clear distinction between
the two.
6. The metaphor of custodian and ward is an apt
characterisation of the relationship between government
and its rural constituencies. The Oxford dictionary
describes a ward as a minor under the care of a guardian
or the court and wardship as a state of tutelage.
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Introduction
There are over 180 MEAs in force today. As such there is
a large variety of environmental issues addressed, making
it a problem to generalise their objectives. These MEAs
have trade measures that vary depending on the type of
environmental issues addressed and this is a source of
conflict in the provisions of the various MEAs. This
paper focuses on the provisions of two MEAs: the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Flora and Fauna and the Convention on
Biological Diversity in relation to:
! conservation and trade issues and related sub-
regional policy instruments in southern Africa
! the IUCN CMWG/CEESP theme on Local
communities, equity and protected areas: Issues and
challenges towards a more equitable and sustainable
future concerning PAs, communities and biodiversity
conservation in the southern African region
! the principles of the WTO that guide the multilateral
trade agenda.
Why focus on only two
MEAs?
CITES has been very controversial within conservation
practices in southern Africa. It conflicts with wildlife
management policies and legislation in the region. The
Convention has in fact imposed bans on trade in some
key environmental products in the region. The CBD, on
the other hand, provides a better frame for integrating
conservation and development. The problem is that
CITES is a legal international agreement and the CBD
cannot override it. However the WTO is making efforts
to create a fair multilateral trade frame. Hence the rights
and obligations of these two MEAs are examined in
relation to those of the WTO.
The philosophy and conservation practice in southern
Africa is based on two key premises:
! that economics in the form of commercial value and
subsistence value is central to all conservation issues.
This is in the form of community livelihoods security
or the economic well-being of communities directly
dependent on natural resources. This is also in the
form of markets that work in the interest of
biodiversity.
! that people, particularly those who live with and are
directly dependent on biodiversity, as well as those
with the propensity to degrade biodiversity most,
must be placed at the centre of efforts to find
solutions to biodiversity loss.
The impact of regional and
 international instruments,
policies and processes and donors





In the first section the two MEAs are analysed and
contrasted by the extent to which they encapsulate the
issues (outlined above) that lie at the heart of
conservation approaches in southern Africa. The CBD is a
young convention and is still evolving. The second
section looks at the relationship between indigenous/
local communities and the environment, setting the basis
for the appreciation of their potential to either conserve
the environment or degrade it. It is a justification for
letting communities/indigenous groups take a central
stage in conservation issues. The third section looks at the
history of global efforts in conservation and the
emergence of and the key provisions of CITES and the
CBD. The last section takes up the challenges faced by the
WTO and its potential role in creating a multilateral trade






The importance of PAs cannot be doubted, but the
current reality is that PAs comprise about 10% of the
worlds surface area (Zbicz & Green 1997). On a global
scale PAs therefore do not make a large contribution to
conservation. The implication is that the bulk of
biodiversity lies outside PAs. Within developing
countries 60% to 80% of the population lives in rural
areas. Rural people are therefore the custodians of the
worlds largest biodiversity. It is also in rural areas that
there is direct dependence on biodiversity for survival
requirements. It has also been noted that the high
dependence on biodiversity is largely by very poor people
who have little or no other resources to turn to (Nasi &
Cunningham 2001; Prescott-Allen & Prescott-Allen
1982). Consequently, the two most persistent political
realities of this decade are degradation of biodiversity and
poverty.
The global challenge today, with its implications for
economic, political and social development, is how to link
conservation of biodiversity with rural development and
poverty reduction. The challenge is to remove biodiversity
from the wild and put it under the custodian and care of
rural communities and link this to benefits or some level
of motivation. Central to the idea that communities are
now the locus for conservation is the concept of
sustainable development. The shift in paradigm from the
central role of state and parks to that of the community is
also premised on the hope that benefits will accrue to the
community. Hence incentives are driving the process and
shaping the thinking of the community on understanding
the limits to the renewal capacity of natural resources  the
source of benefits. The outcomes are improved
livelihoods security, rural development and conservation
(Child, 2000; Martin, 1994; Taylor, 1995).
What the approach in southern Africa has succeeded in
doing is to link authority, responsibility and benefits. For
successful conservation, responsibility cannot be divorced
from authority and duties cannot be divorced from
benefits. The sustainable use approach has more than
doubled land under wildlife (Cumming 1991, 1999).
It is not a coincidence that CBNRM approaches have
developed as a sub-regional issue in southern Africa.
Southern Africa is taking a major step of using natural
resources as a sustainable base for directing rural
development well into the future. To do this, the broad
policy framework has been defined at both the national
and sub-regional levels. The Declaration Treaty and
Protocol of the Southern African Development
Community (SADC 1992) gives a clear vision on inter-
sector co-operation between countries in the region. This
has led to the Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law
Enforcement in the Southern African Development
Community (SADC 1999), and a number of other
regional and bilateral protocols focusing on various
sectors. SADC sectors covered by the protocols include
environment, fisheries, transport, communications and
meteorology, mining, energy, and education.
Historical views of the
environment and
development agenda and
the emergence of the CITES
and CBD Conventions
The norms governing international trade on the one
hand, and sustainable development on the other, have
different origins and objectives (Biggs 2000) and this has
influenced in a significant way the focus and impact of
CITES and the CBD. There are three broad historical
views, namely: the conventional view, the natural
resources versus nature and environment perspective,
and the ecological economic perspective. These views and
their implications are outlined briefly below.
Conventional view: Economy
superior to and above processes in
the environment
Following the Second World War the overriding
imperative was the reconstruction of Europe. The focus
The impact of regional and international instruments, policies and processes
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was on revitalising the economy and the environment
was considered as one of the independent and
substitutable variables for economic production (Folke
1991). The other variables were land, labour and capital.
Land was looked at from its value in speculative
investment and property relations. The environment was
looked at mainly from the point of view of exploiting
natural resources (agriculture, forestry, fisheries and so
on) as inputs into industrial production. Unfortunately,
the ecological and complex interconnectedness between
these and other components of the environment were
not factored in (Barbier 1989). In other words, the limits
to growth regarding forestry, fisheries and agriculture
were not appreciated at the time. At this stage in history,
human activities were on too small a scale to inhibit
environmental functions.
Natural resources and energy
versus nature and environment
perspective and CITES
In the late 1950s and 1960s, the complexity and functions
of the environment were beginning to be appreciated.
Environment degradation and the monetary costs
associated with it were beginning to be appreciated.
However, these problems were still treated as occasional
(Barbier 1989; Folke 1991) and the environment was still
regarded and treated separately from natural resources
(Barbier 1989), so that there was nature and environment
on the one hand, and natural resources and energy on the
other. Insofar as natural resources and energy were
concerned, management still focused on the exploitation
of natural resources and energy. Nature and environment
concerns were looked at from a preservation perspective.
A need was seen to preserve the environment through
the creation of national parks and the preservation of
endangered (over- exploited) species.
The background and justification for the creation of
national parks was set within the Convention Relative to
the Preservation of Fauna and Flora, which was signed in
London in 1933. National parks were depicted in this
convention as large areas where hunting and other
consumptive uses were prohibited. This reasoning led to
the negotiation of CITES, which was signed on 3 March
1973 in Washington. The overriding objective of the
Convention is to regulate and restrict trade in specimens
of species of wild plants and animals that are endangered
through an international legal framework (OECD 1999).
It seeks to address the decline in biodiversity levels and an
increase in the extinction of species through reducing
consumer demand for the endangered species.
The Convention employs a system of permits and
certificates, which are required for export and re-export of
wildlife products of taxa listed in three appendices.
CITES can even impose trade bans. Appendix I contains
species threatened with extinction and trade for
commercial purposes is prohibited. Appendix II includes
about 4 000 animal and over 25 000 plant species which
can only be traded under certain strict controls. CITES
listings may be further defined through annotations (for
example, excluding and including certain parts of plant or
animal). Species may also be split-listed (having sub-
populations listed on both Appendix I and II). Parties
are expected to have sufficient legislation to implement
the convention effectively.
CITES has been in existence for 30 years. Experience
gained over these years has led to review of some of the
implementing mechanisms, the significant review
process being an important one. This empowers the
Animals Committee to periodically review trade in
Appendix II species and make recommendations on the
sustainability of the trade. CITES also has provision for
stronger domestic measures.
By virtue of the CITES annual reporting requirements,
trade in CITESlisted species is well documented. The
main sources of data are customs data and annual reports
compiled by parties to the convention.
CITES has a number of shortcomings:
! The listing of species in appendices is rigid and
inflexible.
! The main objective of CITES is to regulate and
restrict trade on species declining in populations. The
assumption is that trade is the major factor causing
decline in the given species (du Plessis 2000, cited in
Roe et al. 2002). Other factors (for example,  habitat
loss and weather changes), which may in fact be more
important, may be overlooked. This will detract from
assessing the root cause that may then be ignored.
Thus stopping trade may have little conservation
impact because the root causes are not addressed.
! The proposal to list species in the CITES appendices
can be submitted by any party, whether or not that
party is a range state for the species in question. This
has created a lot of problems. There is an increasing
tendency for parties to be motivated by politics
blinding them to the need to follow scientific criteria.
Some species are now untouchables within CITES.
These are the charismatic mega-fauna such as the
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elephant, the whale, the marine turtles, and so on.
These are intelligent animals that should not be
killed for any reason. This is largely the view of
developed countries. Developed country parties have
sufficient resources to adequately prepare for
meetings, lobby and influence other parties.
! The problem is that developing country parties who
have the bulk of the natural resources, and therefore,
the  heavy responsibility and burden to promote
conservation and eradicate poverty, have no bigger
voice than developed countries which are far removed
from the natural resources and keen to apply
economic pressure if their views of conservation are
not respected.
! The issue of politics is evident in the case of the
African elephant. In 1997 Botswana, Namibia and
Zimbabwes respective elephant populations were
placed on Appendix II with a trade quota subject to
heavy conditions. The scientific evidence shows
healthy, growing populations posing a threat to their
habitats. Despite the fact that the elephant
populations for the three countries have grown
further, increasing from 67 000 in 1997 to 89 000
in 2002 for Zimbabwe, and from 40 000 in 1980 to
120 000 in 2002 for Botswana, countries like Kenya
and India are still calling for the placing of these
populations in Appendix I. This means that most
countries can conveniently ignore scientific criteria as
and when it suits them.
! The precautionary principle has the potential to be
abused by justifying trade restrictions or bans on
developing country exports.
! The provision for countries to employ stricter
domestic measures is a problem. It flies in the face of
the need to make non-detriment findings. This
makes CITES provisions inconsistent with the WTO
principles. The clearly serves to undermine the
Convention.
! CITES was not designed, and is therefore not
structured, to address the conservation of species in
relation to the livelihoods of communities. The
decision-making process does not include
consideration of livelihood issues by including
information on the socio-economic aspects of
harvests and trade in the significant reviews and the
supporting statements of CITES listing proposals,
and considering that information when designing
and recommending remedial measures (Roe et al.
2002). Socio-economic dimensions of wildlife trade
are not included in the work programmes under the
Animals and Plant Committees.
! Others will argue that CITES was established to
address the conservation of wild species in
international trade and not the livelihoods of
communities (Roe et al. 2002). This position lacks a
clear appreciation and understanding of the complex
factors at play. If wildlife and other natural resources
do not pay their way as outlined earlier, these natural
resources will not compete with increasing human
population and ever-increasing demands for more
lands for cropping and the consequence loss of
habitats.
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Table 3: Key issues related to CITES
Objective Current listing status on appendices:
Keep populations above levels that do not threaten Appendix I:  > 800 species species
survival Appendix II: 4 000 animals (including charismatic mega-
fauna such as Loxodonta africana); 25 000 plants
Focus: Weakness:
Regulate trade to prevent commercial export of · Strict domestic measures strongly conflicting with
endangered species WTO principles.
· Politics/emotionalism take precedence over scientific
Mechanism criteria ·
Listing on appendices · Trade taken as the only key factor causing species decline
· Use of permits and certificates for export and re-export This will result in failure to address the correct causes of
of listed wildlife products species loss
· Trade bans · Failure to address conservation of species in relation to
· Significant trade processes community livelihoods ·
Stronger domestic measures · Commercially valuable timber & fish species (even those
· Split-listing with evidence of decline) not readily tabled for discussion
· Listing of species regardless of  population status at
different ranges (for example, African elephant 
300 000 in southern Africa)
66
local communities, equity and conservation in southern africa
! There is no requirement for benefit sharing for
countries of origin for species under captive-breeding
programmes.
The ecological economic
perspective and the CBD
One of the key insights into the environment/
development dialogue was given for the first time in the
1987 Bruntland Report. The report enunciated the
principle that the development and exploitation of
natural resources should be sustainable over time (Biggs
2000). Key elements in this view are:
! that natural resources are finite and have intrinsic
limits to growth (as outlined earlier in this paper)
! that natural resources should be exploited rationally
and preserved for the benefit of future generations
! that environmental considerations be integrated in
economic plans, programmes and projects. This was
the precept of sustainable development (including its
main instruments, environmental policy and
legislation), as a requirement for all environment and
development projects.
That we are approaching environmental limits on a global
scale is reflected in warning signals such as global warming
and ozone depletion (Folke 1991).
These are the issues and thoughts that led to the
conceptualisation of the term biodiversity and the
negotiation of the CBD. The same principle has also been
in the Rio Declaration (principle 4), Agenda 21, and
outlined in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). In relation to GATT, the issue is to ensure that
policies related to international trade and those
concerning the environment are mutually supportive in
the interest of sustainable development.
The CBD has a holistic approach that encapsulates the
following elements: sustainable livelihood issues,
financial mechanisms, and incentive measures (including
compensation schemes) at the local and international
levels. In other words the CBD calls for the integration of
environmental concerns and development. Key
considerations here are:
! the need for economics to be central in all
conservation issues
! economic prosperity and markets that work for the
interest of biodiversity. Conservation and
development policies need to use economic and
market forces as effective tools in promoting
sustainable growth and conservation
! communities to be at the centre of conservation
efforts
! the need for of all parts of society including
governments, public interest groups, consumers and
the private sector to take the responsibility for
sustainable development (Brundtland 1987). Inter-
sector co-ordination is critical.
The provisions of the CBD are more consistent with
conservation efforts in southern Africa than those of
CITES. CBNRM initiatives in southern Africa offer a
frame within which to test the integration of conservation
and development and to monitor the outcome. Formal
CBNRM has been in practice in the region for over ten
years. Some lessons are emerging. Formal CBNRM has
involved the state with the devolution of authority and
responsibility over wildlife and other natural resources
and the right to benefit from these natural resources to
the community.
Key elements within CBNRM practices that are consistent
with the CBD convention are.
! state allocation/transfer in access to natural resources
and power (to make decisions) over these natural
resources to a local community
! state allocation of the rights to benefit from the
natural resources to the local community
! making tangible economic benefits realised by the
community  creating conditions for economic prosperity
! creating the need to maximise benefits by looking after
the resources or adding value to the resources, by
getting the market value for the resource.
Steps are being taken at the international level, particularly
at the level of the CBD, to develop processes that increase
the competence of communities to manage their natural
resources. This is through the CBD work programmes
and the cross-cutting ecosystem approach. The work
programme relevant to CBNRM and southern Africa is
that within the thematic area of the arid and semi-arid
ecosystem.
Within the context of the CBD work programmes to be
adopted and implemented by states is the need to build
the technical capacity of communities to carry out adaptive
management by:
! developing local ecological and socio-economic
indicators
! using these indicators to monitor ecosystem changes
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that take place from the interaction of the
communities with the ecosystem
! developing data bases and the capacity to interpret the
data they collect
! understanding and responding to ecological feedback
mechanisms.
The role of the WTO
There are clear linkages between trade, poverty alleviation
and sustainable development. These linkages are
complex but they can be summarised as:  increased
volume of trade will lead to increased economic growth,
which should lead to improved employment conditions,
and improved living standards through increased income
distribution in society. The understanding is that poverty
reduction is sensitive to income distribution. From the
perspective of the environment, the degradation of the
environment is sensitive to poverty. There is a cycle
between poverty and environment degradation, and
economic prosperity and markets that work for the
interest of biodiversity are essential for conservation
success and for promoting sustainable development.
Hence the WTO has a fundamental role to play. The
problem is that the multilateral trade field is not even
with regard to market access and the rights and
obligations of MEAs and those of the WTO.
The markets for the developed countries, including for
environmental goods and services, are inaccessible to
developing countries and most of these have vulnerable
economies. The markets of most developed countries are
protected by high tariffs, domestic subsidies and other
non-tariff measures. While it is accepted that MEAs are
international legal agreements and should be given due
respect, there are inconsistencies between WTO rules and
MEAs. The problem with CITES has been outlined
above.
Conclusion
This paper may have given the impression that CITES is
all negative. This would not be accurate. CITES has
probably been most positive in building up data (which
is captured in the Elephant Trade Information System
(ETIS) database on global trade in plant and animal
specimens. It is impossible to capture all the data, but the
available data shows trends and gives insights into
monitoring and the management of international trade
under CITES.
Many in southern Africa call either for doing away with
CITES or making CITES a technical wing of the CBD
responsible for trade data collection and management.
Others may consider these views to be extreme, but this is
a call to set up processes of reviews of MEAs with the
intention of harmonising inconsistencies in the provisions
of the individual MEAs. In this regard the United
Nations Environment Programme needs to work closely
with the WTO.
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Experiences from southern Africa indicate that
protected areas (PAs) and community approaches
are complementary in their contribution to
conserving biological diversity. Yet the efforts of
rural people to conserve biological diversity are
rarely officially recognised by governments. It is
clear that this view has to change and that
governments have to not only recognise
community inputs in conservation, but also to
protect communities access to these resources.
This volume covers conservation practices from the
pre-colonial to post-colonial periods, the efficacy
of commu-nity-based natural resource management
practices in southern Africa, conditions for effective
conservation in the sub-continent, as well as the
impact of international instruments, policies,
processes and donors on effective, sustainable
and equitable conservation in the region. It
synthesises lessons learnt from experience in
southern Africa, and makes recommendations
on the importance of involving and recognising
rural communities in conservation efforts as an
input into the deliberations of the World Parks
Congress to be held in South Africa- in
September 2003.
Theme on Indigenous and Local Communities,
Equity and Protected Areas
